Right, but what advantage does DNSCrypt have over a local DNSSEC aware resolver? If you can't trust the local resolver you have more serious problems than DNS.
DNSSEC provides no privacy. In fact, DNSSEC provides in the real world very few benefits of any kind, which is one of the reasons it's seen so little uptake in the 22 years during which the IETF has been working on it. Its most credible technical application is as a replacement for the CA system (which is a terrible idea).
In the real world, for privacy, there are essentially two competing approaches: DNSCrypt and DNS-Privacy. Both are unrelated to DNSSEC. DNSCrypt uses a custom protocol to encrypt DNS transactions, and DNS-Privacy uses TLS. Neither require, or even benefit from, deployment of DNSSEC.
As others have stated, DNSSec only solves for authenticity of the data, not privacy.
DNSCrypt has been designed to both authenticate, authorize and encrypt the channel.
Using both in conjunction means that you have a private connection with authenticated data coming from the upstream resolver. Now the obvious issue is you don't know what the upstream resolver does with that...
https://sockpuppet.org/blog/2015/01/15/against-dnssec/
In the real world, for privacy, there are essentially two competing approaches: DNSCrypt and DNS-Privacy. Both are unrelated to DNSSEC. DNSCrypt uses a custom protocol to encrypt DNS transactions, and DNS-Privacy uses TLS. Neither require, or even benefit from, deployment of DNSSEC.