[anilgulecha]

A note on 'lifecycle': that's not how it works -- the age of use/lifecycle is not a function of the bit-length in hash, or inevitability of the current standard being broken.

Technically MD5(128bits) and SHA1(160bits) lengths are sufficient for hashes, but they had cryptographic weaknesses -- the functions had cryptanalytic attacks, which reduced bruteforce from the complete keyspace to something of a much smaller magnitude. These weaknesses are what has lead to the deprecation of MD5 and SHA1.

It is definitely possible that new crypt-analytic attacks could be shown on SHA256/512, but none have so far been publicly provided. Hence the confidence in them.

[amluto]

> Technically MD5(128bits) and SHA1(160bits) lengths are sufficient for hashes, but they had cryptographic weaknesses

Not true. A 128-bit hash gets collisions after ~2^64 tries. A big cluster can find targeted 128-bit collisions. To attack something like git, the entire attack can be done offline.

The big MD5 X.509 break needed cryptanalysis to make it day I because the attack needed to happen in real time.

[rocqua]

The threat models in which 64 bits of security (by birthday attack on 128bit hashes) is insufficient are really limited.

[IncRnd]

That is misleading, since a birthday attack is not required. The security strength of hashes is not measured by the length of the hashes.

md5 was first "broken" in 1995. As of 10 years ago, a collision attack took only a few seconds. Plus, there are a _number_ of other attacks on the hash.

[rocqua]

The argument I replied to concerned best-case for length. I.e. a perfect hash at 128 bits delivers 64 bits of security against collisions. (Note the 'perfect' part)

64 bits of security is good enough against most non-nation state actors.

Obviously, MD5 (and sha-1) aren't anywhere near perfect hashes. And obviously, you need to look at more than length when judging a hash.

Basically my point was that md5's hash length isn't a big problem.

[IncRnd]

You can rent Amazon time and create an md5 collision for less money than people spend going to a movie. Restating the issue as "a perfect hash is perfect" may be correct in a limited sense, but it is also highly misleading.

64 bits of ideal security is about half the industry accepted security strength in bits for a hash function.

[amluto]

The bitcoin network does 2^64 hashes in about 10 seconds. 10 seconds of bitcoin network is a far cry from nation state only.

[makomk]

For comparison, this is about the same level of cost as the recent collision attack on SHA-1. So even a perfect 128-bit hash is at least as broken as SHA-1 is.

[mschwaig]

On the other hand a hash function that works well in all scenarios that constitute a theoretically sound use of a cryptographic hash function is infinitely harder to misuse.

[kozak]

Yep, I'm not about the bit length: 256 bit "should be enough for everybody". But algorithms to generate those 256 bits will change.