I don't know of a survey paper on CFR for multiplayer, but it's been showing up in conference papers and theses.
Here's a link to a shorter conference paper where CFR does converge to a Nash, in 3p Kuhn poker. It describes a family of equilibria, where one player (the second to act, IIRC) has a parameter that can't affect their own EV (...or else it wouldn't be a Nash), but does determine how much the other two players win/lose from each other. This illustrates the problem in equilibria for multiplayer games: if you're players 1 or 3, then even if you are playing a Nash, and everyone else does too (albeit different equilibria), then you can still lose.
https://webdocs.cs.ualberta.ca/~games/poker/publications/AAM...
For a longer read, the best I know of is probably Rich Gibson's PhD thesis. He focussed on CFR for multiplayer games.
Game theory is domain specific. Generic methods in AI tend to dominate domain knowledge over time. Although I agree that other game-theoretic techniques might help here.
Game theory is specific to the domain of agents optimizing outcome in adversarial, cooperative, or (rarely) solitary systems. That's a pretty big domain.
Here's a link to a shorter conference paper where CFR does converge to a Nash, in 3p Kuhn poker. It describes a family of equilibria, where one player (the second to act, IIRC) has a parameter that can't affect their own EV (...or else it wouldn't be a Nash), but does determine how much the other two players win/lose from each other. This illustrates the problem in equilibria for multiplayer games: if you're players 1 or 3, then even if you are playing a Nash, and everyone else does too (albeit different equilibria), then you can still lose. https://webdocs.cs.ualberta.ca/~games/poker/publications/AAM...
For a longer read, the best I know of is probably Rich Gibson's PhD thesis. He focussed on CFR for multiplayer games.
https://webdocs.cs.ualberta.ca/~games/poker/publications/gib...