[clubm8]

So a journalist should use a dumbphone, where every text and call is transmitted in the clear, and the contents of the address book is stored unencrypted, rather than buy an iPhone and leave it at home when attending sensitive meetings?

[nickpsecurity]

The policy of most domestic TLA's is to watch for encrypted calls. Those targeting journalists will likely have the journalist's main number in their system. Disposable, dumb phones on both sides are safer. Although the NSA can detect that, I havent heard that many others do or easily.

Typical advice applies, too. Keep batteries out. Drive away from normal location to somewhere with plenty of people in cell radius but off camera. Batteries in, make call. Prearranged times or periods.

[Canada]

Who could possibly do their job like that?

[nickpsecurity]

Lots of executives and lay people that value privacy. I've met many. In this scenario, the journalist really just needs to be able to receive the call. The need for the OPSEC is mostly on the person leaking stories. They can do less if they don't mind consequences, though.

[jhlgkhkhil]

The difference is that the dumb phone can be thrown away and replaced - not many people can afford to use iphones as burners..

[chimeracoder]

If your threat model includes an adversarial nation-state that is known to engage in passive mass surveillance, using burner phones while transmitting all communication unencrypted is a terrible idea.