| > One can become engrossed in a movie without constantly thinking about one's place in relation to the movie. Being engrossed involves a suspension of awareness. > I'm afraid this just makes no sense to me. Aren't you subjectively aware of the computer in front of your eyes? If you claim to not have "true subjective awareness", I'm curious what "true subjective awareness" would amount to. True subjective awareness requires ontologically committing to dualism, because subjectivity is then irreducible. By which I mean that no account for true first-person experience is possible using only third-person objective facts. > An illusion is when our subjective experience of reality does not match actual reality, but to claim that our subjective experience is itself an illusion? That seems like a contradiction in terms. That definition of illusion begs the question, like I said, so I categorically reject it. If you eliminate the dependency on "subjective experience of reality" you get "perception of reality does not match actual reality", which is exactly what I said. > For me, the knowledge that I have true subjective awareness is a basic first principle, along the lines of "I think, therefore I am". Ah, but this too begs the question! The fallacy-free version is "this is a thought, therefore thoughts exist". > Also, what "weak thought experiments" are you referring to? P-zombies, Mary's room, etc. |