| In total, between 22 September 2016 and 18 February 2017 we now estimate based on our logs the bug was triggered 1,242,071 times. Wow, so just as bad as we thought. We did not find any passwords, credit cards, health records, social security numbers, or customer encryption keys in the sample set. BUT WAIT, THERE'S MORE The sample included thousands of pages and was statistically significant to a confidence level of 99% with a margin of error of 2.5%. Oh, so it could actually be as a high as 2.5% leaking encryption credentials. And if none of the data was found to leak anything sensitive where the fuck is the dataset? I've been around way too long to take a "study" like this at face value without third party verification. I also enjoy the straight up lie at the end: We are continuing to work with third party caches to expunge leaked data and will not let up until every bit has been removed. That sounds great right? Well, its too bad that a lot of 'third parties' are a box sitting on the corporate network edge that hasn't been touched in 5 years. Deleting all of this data from third party caches is not physically possible. In fact it might actually make things worse because it's destroying evidence of which credentials were leaked. |
One of the caches they worked with was Baidu, which has direct ties to Chinese intelligence. Just because it isn't publicly available doesn't mean people aren't still pouring over it looking for useful data.