[jacquesm]

It appears that you do not understand the basics of how this works: even if the print changes in an absolute sense what does not change is that many bits from one print to another are constant. Those are the bits that matter, and if there are enough of them then they can be used to track you across sessions, even across session using Tor and sessions not using Tor.

Tie that all together and it may very well be possible to tie an upload using the Tor network to a particular user visiting some random website at a later date.

You're leaking bits all the time and not all that many of them are required to uniquely identify you.

See https://33bits.org/ for an easy to consume introduction.

[hubert123]

Okay I see, so somebody has to keep a massive database of all the fingerprints and constantly keep trying to cross reference every browserprint with every other browserprint. Doesnt seem like an exact science but I get that it's technically possible to find some matches.