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by WayneBro
3422 days ago
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> They aren't going to just dump it all because you and a few others find the priviledge model inconvenient. > But, no, it won't allow unchecked IPC... And I'm not asking for either. How about just giving the user a simple permission like they have for allowing UWP apps to access your Microphone, Camera, Bluetooth, etc? Seems a little silly that my UWP app can access everything on my network except for my own darn computer via localhost, doesn't it? |
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Unfortunately for historical reasons localhost (127.0.0.1) are treated almost like a named pipe. Meaning a LOT of Win32 (and UNIX-style) applications treat data over that path as "trusted."
For one specific example, I've used a HP driver that installs a local webserver for no good reason, and if you can send a specially crafted request it will execute that request in the SYSTEM context. All you need is localhost access and knowledge to pull it off (this is not exploitable remotely).
A lot of software has been designed with the assumption that localhost is trusted and they have therefore used it for IPC. This is exactly what you're attempting to do too. But let me ask you this, what happens if a third party UWP application tries to use your localhost backdoor? Does it allow UWP malware? How are you going to verify that only YOUR UWP application connects to your Node.js instance?
File IPC allows you to limit it to just your UWP application because presumably the file will be within that UWP application's unique storage block. It might be a pain but at least the ultimate result is secure.