|
Use Tails or Whonix which prevents leaking data outside of the Tor network. Qubes OS makes Whonix easy/transparent (though I haven't had the pleasure of trying out Qubes yet). Never access files downloaded over Tor outside of those environments, and _never_ mix identities: if you're going to be pseudononymous, don't access files downloaded under another pseudonym or visit websites you'd access (especially if logging in) under another. If you're going to be anonymous, don't save the data: let it be ephemeral, which is easy in the case of Tails, which is ephemeral by default. Always use Tor Browser, not Tor over Foxyproxy in a vanilla Firefox or something. Don't rely on torify on your normal setup for complete anonymity, for reasons above. But it depends on your threat model. I _do_ do both things in the previous paragraph for my day-to-day stuff where my threat model involves e.g. advertisers and other privacy-invading trackers, where I'm reading tech-related articles or downloading videos of talks, for example. But that involves a number of other addons as well (e.g. Privacy Badger, HTTPS Everywhere, NoScript, uBlock Origin, self-destructing coookies, ...). Edit: Forgot to mention: https://www.whonix.org/wiki/DoNot |
Use Whonix, not Tails. Tails doesn't do a particularly good job preventing leaks outside of Tor network.