TPP felt to me one of the issues that really defined the Trump campaign and the voters it appealed to. I think Clinton eventually [0] took a public stance against the TPP, but ignoring the public's perception of her relation to the truth, she clearly did not prioritize the dismantling of TPP in the way that Trump did. In fact, it's really hard to imagine her undoing President Obama's work were she in office.
If someone believes international free trade is the cause of the gutting of American manufacturing and by proxy, local/regional economies, it's hard to argue that Clinton presented little more than nominal lip service to the cause, at least compared to the way that Trump and Sanders made it a core priority of their campaign and stump speeches.
Well, rust-belt protectionism played a key part (NAFTA, TPP). I was a Bernie supporter and was really disappointed when Hillary didn't co-op Trump's working-class rhetoric or get energized to at least compete in that battlefield. This is what Bill excels at. Obviously she shut him out of the core team.
Also, she was not that compelling as a candidate. And had all those negatives that I won't go into. Most of them false. But still, why do you put up a establishment candidate on a change cycle (looking at you Wassermann and Brazille, core dems)?
Edit: I don't especially like TPP but I saw it as a strategic shift to Asia for the US. Now China will likely join a TPP-light and really benefit. For better or worse this is going to be a big change over the next 20 years.
This has been proven true more than once. Whenever "their turn" candidates run, they loose. See Kerry, McCain, Romney. Socioeconomics aside, Americans love novelty. With Trump in power, the game has been elevated to a different level and I think none of leading Dem politicians can unseat him in 2020. After a sufficient time has passed, when his novelty has worn off, some red blooded alpha-male type has to burst into scene and start challenging him. I am looking at you, Jason Kander!
>As for Trump, he's done 2 of the "Seven actions to protect American workers" he promised for the first 100 days in office (PDF)
Pretty easy to hit milestones when the goals are low. "Announce intent" and "Stop bill that was never going to pass congress" aren't exactly adroit acts of statesmanship.
"Announce intent" and "Stop bill that was never going to pass congress" aren't exactly adroit acts of statesmanship.
OTOH "making a clear, simple statement about something that hits a raw nerve with tens of millions of working-class Americans -- but which Hillary won't touch with a ten-foot pole until way too late" matters a hell of a lot. And has a lot to do with how this man came to get as far as he has, so far.
No it doesn't, or at least not as far as I can read. A summary of that email is
> Here is a letter I've drafted outlining our position on trade. This draft assumes that Clinton will ultimately support the TPP and TPA, but we may change the letter dramatically if Clinton does not end up supporting the TPP and TPA (ostensibly because the final agreement doesn't cause a net gain in jobs).
It sounds like the criticism is "I hate that she might change her mind based on new evidence". I'd say its a good thing that they were willing to alter their policy based on whether it would create jobs or not.
> It sounds like the criticism is "I hate that she might change her mind based on new evidence". I'd say its a good thing that they were willing to alter their policy based on whether it would create jobs or not.
The only "new evidence" that would sway Clinton's opinion on the TPP were poll numbers.
"Contingency" was exactly the word I was thinking of. From the LA Times article I referenced, here is one summarization of her publicly stated opposition:
> “I still believe in the goal of a strong and fair trade agreement in the Pacific as part of a broader strategy both at home and abroad, just as I did when I was secretary of State,” she said in a statement. “But the bar here is very high and, based on what I have seen, I don't believe this agreement has met it.”
Of course Clinton, nor Obama, would sign a trade agreement that wouldn't be a "fair" agreement. But "fair" is not binary. Clinton could just as easily sign the bulk of the agreement as president after she claims that her advisers have negotiated for some concessions to make TPP more "fair". But Trump from the very start said he was going to kill it.
As another example, Trump, and every other politician, has been following the popular sentiment that drug companies (e.g. Shkreli, Epi-Pens, etc) shouldn't be gouging people on life-saving drugs. There's a lot of strong ways to criticize drug companies, and every politician does it because it means free positive press. But Trump outright said in his last president-elect presser that drug companies were "Getting away with murder." [0]
With healthcare in general, it remains to be seen if his promised reforms are going to be a net benefit. Or whether killing free trade will be a net benefit, for that matter. But Trump at least states his views in clear terms. Again, not saying that that's ultimately a great way of governance (massive government decisions and policy are a work of process and compromise), but hey, that's the kind of personality people say they want in their politicians.
it remains to be seen [...] whether killing free trade will be a net benefit
Sure, if you hate reading history books. The thing is, we actually have quite a lot of evidence about matters of international trade already which one side in this debate consistently ignores in favor of hypotheticals.
Keeping your options open is sound strategy because humans are imperfect at predicting the future and frequently overestimate their intellectual acumen. Why wouldn't you want a fallback position in case your first plan didn't work out?
Look, this email is pretty typical for political operatives of every campaign. You would see much uglier stuff (I think) if you saw the emails of Trump operatives (graft, self-dealing, calling voters idiots where you could shoot someone on 5th st, etc).
TPP was an easy call. For NAFTA he's going to pull some Carrier renegotiate bullshit. Smoke and mirrors. It's too big to kill. Maybe over 10 years. Maybe.
Don't get me wrong I like protecting jobs in the US and have been very pro-US made. But Trump is not that and is just turning the steal-from-middle-class dial up to 11.
Following through on your promises is not a good thing if you make bad promises. People who voted against him did so because of what he promised to do, not because they didn't think he would deliver.
> This Podesta email isn't one of the DKIM-signed ones, but it shows that Clinton was ultimately going to support TPP regardless of what she was saying:
No, it doesn't show that at all. It shows that staff had done some preparatory work on the explicitly-uncertain assumption that an ongoing discussion would end up a particular way. Which clearly shows that, at least as far as the author of the email was concerned, what Clinton would end up doing was unknown.
>TPP felt to me one of the issues that really defined the Trump campaign and the voters it appealed to.
It also helped define Trump's campaign because like a lot of issues his stance on it had little relation to the actual facts. TPP had plenty of problem that made it overall a bad agreement. Opposing it was generally smart. However, there was no indication that such a deal would have harmed the US economy. There is also wide consensus among economists that free trade benefits the nation at large. It isn't the fault of the economists that this country does a bad job of sharing the benefits of such deals with the entire population.
Interestingly at today's White House Press Briefing, a reporter asked the Press Secretary whether the Trump Administration thought that it could surround/contain China with bilateral trade agreements the way that the TPP had intended to do on a multilateral basis.
China has a couple of free trade deals in the region. It has a multilateral effort (RCEP) which is somewhat stalled and primarily pursued bilateral trade agreements.
This may put American and China toe-to-toe in reaching agreements with Asian Pacific states. There’s a question about the quality of the trade deals that can be reached, if the target nations are clever enough to play Beijing and Washington off against one another.
The Trump Administration has suggested that bilateral agreements are better because they don’t devolve into “least common denominator” the way multilateral deals do; and that they also allow the deals to be quickly withdrawn from or renegotiated to account for new realities.
Here's the real story every time you read about the comparison between multilateral and bilateral international agreements (speaking very generally):
* Powerful nations want bilateral agreements, because it's the strong negotiating with the weak. Imagine the U.S. negotiating a trade deal with Nicaragua: The U.S. position is overwhelmingly strong; they could walk away and cancel all trade with Nicaragua; the U.S. would hardly notice and Nicaragua's economy would be devastated. (EDIT: I'll add that this is true of the powerful everywhere; e.g., large businesses don't want to negotiate with government or Congress (law and regulation) or a class in court (a class action), they want to deal with individual consumers one by one.)
* Supporters of an international rules-based, law-based order, and of a democratic and rights-based order want broad multilateral agreements. Then the weak nations can band together and resist the powerful; it gives them self-determination, the foundation of democracy; it creates rule of law rather than rule of the powerful. Also, instead of an exceptionally complex system of individual agreements between each pair of countries, it creates one standard - much more like a law. Imagine a global business trying to parse the individual trade deals between every pair of countries from its supply chain to its retail customers - an incredibly, needlessly complex level of regulation compared to one international standard. Imagine if the 50 U.S. states only had bilateral trade deals with each other - that would be 1,225 deals, endless red tape for a national business (and there are many more countries than U.S. states). A major reason the U.S. is so wealthy is that it's the largest single, unified economy; that's what the EU hopes to equal.
For example, in the South China Sea, China says they want bilateral negotiations with each country - they oppose the current U.S.-led international order and want negotiations they can dominate. The U.S. and China's neighbors want a multilateral deal; they want to continue the rule of international law and the U.S.-led order, and want to negotiate from a position of strength.
My guess in this case is that it's a reflection of the fact that Trump, the Republicans, and their big business constituents prefer rule of the powerful.
To add to this comment, there’s more nuance when speaking less generally:
* In cases where there is competition between powerful nations, weaker nations can and do gain advantage by playing the interests of one country off of one another. For instance, during the Cold War the United States and Soviet Union would engage in trade, weapons, and security deals. States caught in the middle understood that both empires were competing with one another to either expand their network outward or prevent the other from doing so (America often included “and you may not trade with the Soviet Union” as an aspect of its bilateral negotiations) would try to internalize the security/strategic value that the empires sought - rather than the pure quid-pro-quo of markets.
* The United States effort with both NAFTA and the TPP were to contain Russia and China, respectively, by building a coalition of countries with trade that excludes each specific United States adversary. This strategically weaponizes the second point above: coalitions of nations together banded together against a more powerful economic force. Similarly, the Chinese RCEP agreement bands together trade centered around the Chinese economy, and excludes the United States. Indeed, the Soviet Union was, as a security/power concept, an idea that a trade network on the Eurasian Supercontinent would be able to outperform and outcompete other continental sized trade networks (the United States), which led the United States to disrupt the trade framework with proxy war, etc.
* Similar episodes are common throughout history: Nasser’s Egypt had tried, unsuccessfully, to create a Republic of Arab nations in the Middle East, so that they could collectively bargain and negotiate with external powers such as Europe and the United States. This was considered a security threat to these powers, because the West much preferred strong-on-weak bilateral agreements, protectorates and mandates.
From the security side of the coin, great nations including China, Russia (now the Eurasian Union), and the United States strategically try to build coalitions of small nations against their powerful adversaries in an attempt to disrupt their ability to successfully compete.
The Trump Administration decision to abandon this represents an idea that the United States will be able to “out-deal” regional competitors (primarily China but also Japan, South Korea) on a one-for-one basis. My guess is that the diplomacy will get very nasty - even if its all in the back room.
Thanks; that's a great addition to the discussion. One important nit:
> The United States effort with both NAFTA and the TPP were to contain Russia and China, respectively, by building a coalition of countries with trade that excludes each specific United States adversary
As I understand it (I'm no expert in the field), U.S. policy in regard to China is that its rise to superpower status is inevitable, and the U.S.'s strategy is to get China to join a rules-based (i.e., law-based) international order - preferably the existing one - rather than create an anarchic great power competition that often results in terrible wars. On a political level, TPP was designed as a step in that direction; it wasn't intended to exclude China but to compel them to join a rules-based trade regime for the Pacific - i.e., either play by the rules or be excluded from trade. The goal was that they would join.
> As I understand it (I'm no expert in the field), U.S. policy in regard to China is that its rise to superpower status is inevitable
Interesting. My understanding is quite the opposite: that the U.S. policy in regard to China is that its rise to superpower status is in question.
China is 25 years or more from being on par with the United States in terms of military projection in its own region (much less power projection in distant lands and seas). China has legitimate issues with all of its territories that have strategic resources: its water is in Tibet, its minerals and oil is in its Uyghur region. The United States today has China surrounded by the "first island chain." China's economy is robust, but has inherent weaknesses that could cause it to fracture as it tries to jump the 'middle income gap'. Indeed out of several dozens of states that have attempted jumping the gap, only a couple have succeeded. Ongoing sovereignty disputes in Hong Kong and Taiwan keep the Chinese mainland divided and focused in on its own territory. Japan today could match Chinese military might, and with the right trajectories could maintain an upper hand in the future. America has tried to block Chinese multilateral/international banking efforts (AIIB, ADB, etc) and it's admission into the Special Economic Basket of currencies at the IMF. Today the United States (well, under the prior administration...) is trying to prevent full membership of China inside the WTO, and it's membership isn't guaranteed. India forms a natural check on Chinese regional power as its population is larger than China and its economy is growing at even faster rates. Russia (which shares a huge and important border with China) and America both eye China and it's ambitions and could individually or together align to snuff Chinese expansion where they to find a good justification. China's international investments are questionable, as much of them are in countries with poor histories of solvency (this is a strategic bet on the part of China). It's One Belt One Road infrastructure project is vulnerable to stability issues in Central Asia (of which there is a long history). The people's party in China also (rightly) fears regime change operations in their country - this remains a real possibility. China has a burgeoning nuclear power (DPRK) on its border, a nation in dispute with a long time American military protectorate.
The United States has a lot of issues it can make with China, from internation trade, currency practices, South China Sea settlement, Taiwan and recognition of independence, Japanese security (look at their reform of National Security legislation), Indian bolstering, Korean Unification, Russia's far east, Central Asian proxies, etc.
The United States is hoping that, with containment pressure on all of China's strategic bets that it won't be able to realize its ambitions to greatness - and will fizzle. This is a practiced playbook: it's how the United States prevented the Soviet Union from realizing super power parity. Curiously, the timeline originally predicted by strategic thinkers for the Soviet Union for parity was also "25 years."
Including China into the "rules-based international order" isn't code for "we want a nation as powerful as our own to also rule the international order." The United States Grand Stategy toward China - indeed toward any and every potential adversary - is to prevent their rise by raising obstacles and costs to its succession.
Our understandings are different, of course, and it's great to learn another perspective. I agree with much of what you say, I just think it weighs less heavily. But a few concrete points:
1) A minor point: China's massive and questionable investments in poor countries are not grants, but loans (at least, based on what I've read). They may be creating leverage over those countries via debt, similar to what the West had at least until massive debt forgiveness.
2) 25 years is a larger number than what I understand. Depending on how it's measured, China's economy already is ~75% of the U.S.'s size and growing much more quickly (though with many serious risks, as you point out). Also, they don't need complete parity, just the prospect of parity - that will be enough to intimidate neighbors. Finally, China currently can focus all their resources on one region; the U.S.'s are distributed globally - one reason Obama hoped to withdraw from some situations.
3) My understanding was that the Cold War 'containment' strategy was not based on the assumption that the USSR would reach parity, but that their Communist economic system was fatally flawed, would inevitably collapse, and all the West had to do was wait and keep the USSR contained. At the time, some did claim that the USSR would or even did catch up - IIRC (a hazy memory of the histories I read) Kissinger thought so and so did the CIA at some point(s). But mainly we tried to pressure them into failing; that's the popular wisdom for why Reagan engaged in an arms buildup and 'Star Wars' missile defense. Regardless, based on hazy memory of numbers from the 1970s that I saw a year ago, the USSR and Warsaw Pact grew to around 50% of NATOs economic strength.
> The United States Grand Strategy
From what I've read many times from foreign policy insiders, such a thing doesn't exist. The foreign policy institutions are so massive and complex, from Dept of State to Dept of Defense to the National Security Advisor and staff, to all the large subcomponents of each, to Congress, to all the career bureaucrats that outlast any President, that getting them all moving in the same direction is impossible. Also, those people are disappointingly and shockingly focused on the day-to-day; few have time for grand strategy. As one person observed,
If, as F. Scott Fitzgerald said, '[t]he test of a first-rate intelligence is the ability to hold two opposing ideas in mind at the same time and still retain the ability to function,' then the government is a genius.
> Supporters of an international rules-based, law-based order, and of a democratic and rights-based order want broad multilateral agreements. Then the weak nations can band together and resist the powerful; it gives them self-determination, the foundation of democracy; it creates rule of law rather than rule of the powerful.
Ironically, most of those small, weaker countries are not democratic.
Yes, and it raises a challenge: Who speaks for their citizens? I think the best argument is that their own governments do - that's true de facto, regardless; and foreign powers are very poor and understanding the needs of locals, no matter how good-willed. The foreign powers tell them what's good for them (and coincidentally what never conflicts with the foreign powers' interests); they don't listen so well.
Powerful nations want bilateral agreements, because it's the strong negotiating with the weak.
And this is why "hard Brexit" is such a risky endeavor for the UK.
The EU is much larger and more experienced in trade deals. From day one Britain will be negotiating from a position of weakness. Once negotiations begin, Britain has a hard 2-year deadline... And to make it worse, they don't have people with experience in bilateral trade agreements because the EU has been in charge of those for 40 years.
The British press is trying to spin this inherently weak position into a matter of EU countries looking to punish Britain, or other such nonsense.
I'd add that the leading European nations, such as the UK, Germany and France, used to be global powers.
Power, soft and hard, depends in large part on pure economic capacity; that enables many things, including economic leverage, larger militaries, and high tech. I don't have the old numbers, but look at this list and imagine their relative power as individual nations before the rise of China and India:
But China and India likely will take two of the top three spots, along with the U.S., leaving those individual European powers far behind - $5 trillion economies in a world of $25 trillion superpowers (making a guess at future growth). They will be small fish among the sharks, no longer with a place at the table or influence on global affairs. A unified EU would be a fourth power, but that takes time, especially the political unification necessary to conduct foreign affairs (where the EU government has unified control of foreign policy - otherwise their words aren't backed up by the actual power). They are moving the wrong way.
China's ability to reach trade deals is probably somewhat limited by the fact that they do not believe in free trade or free movement of money and goods. Seriously, if America put anywhere near the kind of obstacles to trade that China has, economists and the press would freak out.
> China's ability to reach trade deals is probably somewhat limited by the fact that they do not believe in free trade or free movement of money and goods.
China's economy is built on international trade - specifically, their massive exports - and the movement of money and goods. They don't like it in some cases, but that's true of every nation.
The TPP was about something other then money and trade. It was about soft power. It was about containing China. It was about influence.
By cancelling it, Trump has handed 1/3 of the worlds GDP to China. Because I suspect China will step in and seal the deal.
I know Trump railed about the TPP. But I'm sad no one stood up to defend it. Clinton just flipped flopped. I suppose it's easier for the average American to understand "China is taking you job away" (and that's not the whole truth anyway) then to explain the nuances of soft power.
With TPP gone. We now really only have one form of leverage over China. The military. And I damn glad I'm retired from the Army.
I think it is not just about China. If you look at the unholy nexus of TPP, TISA and TTIP, the major economies excluded are Brazil, India, China, Russia and South Africa.
As an Indian, I feel frustrated that the world doesn't think that the economic advancement of India and South Africa are undesirable. Seriously?
As an Indian I understand why India is undesirable perfectly. India is not a cohesive economy or textbook nation-state, it is a multi-national nation and that makes New Delhi weak and states moving in what ever direction they want to go. As usual there is broadly speaking coastal vs hinterland divide in India. This makes India hard to govern and bring a uniform economic or governing policy, added to that a million mutinies big and small across the country make it not desirable country in certain ways.
Maoism and militant trade unionism in the structured economic sector living in parallel with bonded labor and child exploitation in unstructured economy makes it a world of contradictions.
The insanity here (for me) is that I spent years trying to communicate the containment strategy aspect to TPP, even linking to public officials and defense documents specifying that this was the purpose. Ultimately I think I found some small measure success, but for the most part it was unwelcome news that the United States was trying to apply coercive statecraft on a competitor. For the most part the entire political spectrum didn't want to hear what I had to say. What's more those discussions often got hit hard by downvote brigading, trolling and moderator bans.
I never very much liked the TPP as it very clearly represented not only unwelcome international competition and power projection, but also because its chapters (first leaked and then eventually published) very clearly benefit large multinational businesses that lord over the United States' strategic resources, exacerbating issues of economic equality on the homeland. The benefit to the American people was that it made problems for the Rise of China - the real possibility of which could see my generations' children and grandchildren in an America that doesn't dominate the world like we do today.
I always felt like there was a better way: a way to both build America so that it is happy and safe, and create deals that benefit all social classes in the homeland.
I'm fairly certain that the Trump Administrations' instincts here will be to replace economic coercion with military coercion and I'm fairly certain that the administration's replacement deals will just as unequally favor those in America who already wield an outsized share of power.
In this regard I'm glad to see TPP go but I would much rather have seen a more creative administration holding the reins.
One of the TPP sections that concerned me the most was where corporations could sue nations for passing legislation that detrimentally affected their business (think countries passing environmental restrictions on companies). My concern was greatest that US companies would do this to other nations, like Australia where I am.
I'm assuming now that US companies won't be able to do this, but is the TPP still binding between the rest of the ratified countries?
>One of the TPP sections that concerned me the most was where corporations could sue nations for passing legislation that detrimentally affected their business (think countries passing environmental restrictions on companies).
This is not what the TPP said. Corporations can already sue nations. The TPP defined an arbitration system, one that nations have a long, long history of winning in.
The Senator says: "ISDS would allow foreign companies to challenge U.S. laws." But my understanding is it can't be used to challenge any law whatsoever. Could be wrong (although the latter makes sense, while the former doesn't).
I'm not that into the TPP from what I've read of it, but doesn't bailing on it just open the door for China to take the leadership role and dictate commerce norms for those still involved?
TPP included some things that were just flat out bad, like the "Investor State Dispute System" (a.k.a. Corporate Sovereignty) and exporting the USA's draconian "Intellectual Property" regime as one of those corporate norms. Both of those things make ordinary citizen's lives worse, at least in the very short term, and almost certainly in the longer term.
The TPP seemed to be more about free flow of capital, rather than free trade as such. Free trade is probably a good thing, but the TPP didn't include free movement of labor, which is certainly a good part of free trade.
The TPP was more "Globalism for me, but not for thee" from the multinationals.
Yes, but the funny end result of this is that bilateral trade deals will likely include similar or even more draconian restrictions w/r/t corporate sovereignty and IP laws as the policies being put forth are US-standard.
Which might not be true. If the deal doesn't benefit the country, guess what will happen? Just don't sign it. Most of the TPP countries didn't have a bilateral agreement with US at this moment, so it is the status quo.
And since Trump's government is backtracking to protectionism, manufacturing jobs will less likely be delegated to countries like Vietnam, and countries like Japan doesn't have its back from US to confront China(Abe must be scratching his head right now, lol), I think it is much less appealing for those countries to hand over domestic control over regulations in exchange for something lesser.
Yes, that's true. But now people are aware of multinationals slipping sops to themselves into trade treaties. Every single bilateral agreement gets voted on in Senate for treaties, and both houses (?) for laws. Stakeholders like the bulk of the populace can be heard multiple times, once on each deal on these issues. One, fast-track vote on TPP where McConnell could stifle all debate procedurally is kind of a farce when nobody but multinationals negotiated it.
Probably. The question is whether or not the US can still negotiate a better trade deal on our terms, but China will definitely seize this chance to propose their own less-drama version for other Pacific countries.
The results of Trump's actions WRT TPP are a couple years down the road. By dismantling the TPP now he reaps the political benefits, leaving the negatives for later. This allows him to expand on his agenda.
Which is how it should be. Why a trade deal whose members are mostly Asian countries, excluded the largest economy in that area, and who in fact being the biggest trade partners of those countries? China should be in the center of such deal, not being excluded from it.
Whether you think it's a good or bad thing depends on your point of view. The TPP is very complicated, and it was negotiated behind closed doors. Some people didn't like it simply because of that. They believe that policy should be made in the open, not in the shadows.
There were two main things that the TPP did that caused a lot of controversy: it streamlined trade between signatories, which is great if you're a business owner or a consumer (because it drives down the cost of goods and labor) or a worker in a country with high unemployment and low wages (I'm talking Bangladesh here, not the U.S.). It's not so great if you're a worker in a country with high wages like the U.S. because free trade tends to drive wages towards being more uniform, so if you're in a high-wage country you can expect your wages to go down, or to lose your job altogether.
The second controversial provision was stronger enforcement of intellectual property laws, often allowing corporations to take unilateral measures against alleged infringers that bypassed local laws. The allegation was that this provision effectively turned multinational corporations into de-facto governments, thus undermining democracy.
These are the main reasons the TPP was very unpopular in the U.S.
The argument in favor of the TPP was that the status quo has a lot of problems that need fixing (which is true) and that the TPP, flawed as the process and the result may have been, was our best shot at fixing them (which may also have been true).
It is constitutional to join treaties that otherwise undermine the constitution, the nation's autonomy, sovereignty in general.
Negotiating any treaty behind closed doors, let alone seeing encroachments on discretionary rights like intellectual property in the various leaks, should be met with skepticism and determent.
In addition to what was said, it also was an important piece in containing Chinese domination of the region. It would bind the nations into an international order that was not subject to (or strongly protected from) Chinese leverage of influence. Now China is much more free impose their will by threatening the economies of their neighbors.
I think dismissing it as "political theater" simplifies the cause and effect, and the legislative process. Congress was controlled by Republicans in Obama's last term, but the popular belief was that not only would Clinton win in a dominating fashion, but the effects of her dominance would propagate downballot and win the Senate for Democrats, and at least make the House much closer. If that had happened, TPP would seem pretty likely to pass Congress in some form or other. At the very least, there would be more negotiations. Negotiations began back in 2008; Congressional reluctance was unlikely to kill TPP. Trump outright abandoning the plan will kill it more decisively.
Yeah, and it's great theatre! It's ultimately meaningless, but it does reinforce the story that Trump and the Republicans are trying to tell.
I live in Canada, and the politician who negotiated on behalf of my country is in the neighbouring city. At some point I hope to have a chance to ask him face-to-face how he justified negotiating that deal in secret.