| > I'll point out none of the security researchers in the article dispute the vulnerability is as described. Just so you know, tptacek signed this letter. I did as well. Calling it a backdoor was outright dishonest. I've written backdoors. I even won a cryptography backdoor contest at DEFCON with one of my designs. https://underhandedcrypto.com/2015/08/08/crypto-privacy-vill... https://paragonie.com/blog/2016/01/on-design-and-implementat... If it's to be said that there is a vulnerability, then it is simply, "If there are any messages that haven't been delivered yet, and the recipient changes keys, the client will re-encrypt to the new public key before alerting." Okay, a lot of security experts wouldn't make that trade-off, especially if they were trying to compete with Signal. But WhatsApp isn't a Signal competitor. The alternative means of contacting someone you'd normally use WhatsApp for is SMS, because that's what people are using today. Most WhatsApp users aren't interested in encryption. It just works for them. They may still need it, but they don't care about it. Even if you could exploit this, you get: - Any undelivered messages (if any)
- No past messages
- No stealth either; the user does get alerted
So, yes, we do dispute the vulnerability is as described, especially when it was called a backdoor. |