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by pfg
3445 days ago
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That's why WhatsApp allows you to verify your recipient's key out of band. The scenario you describe would cause the identity key to change and trigger a notification if one of the potential clients has that option enabled. There's really no way to avoid out-of-band key verification in end-to-end encrypted messaging unless you fully trust the service. Other than that, the best you can hope for is after-the-fact detection of MitM attacks through something like Key Transparency, but that still requires that someone's actively looking for that. |
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But only for messages sent by the sender AFTER the key-change notification. Those still in the send queue get re-encrypted with the new key of the cop phone and then resent without confirmation, and this is the attack window and the bug!
Oh, and most people don't enable the key-change notification anyway so they won't even know that their dealer got arrested.