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by FiloSottile
3445 days ago
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And as others said before, Monero does some sketchy weak mixing of something like a 100 tx, which is really not enough for long term anonymity (think what happens when the other 99 outputs are spent). EDIT: there are a couple papers linked in a child comment that seem to analyze this which I haven't read entirely yet; the following two points still stand. You don't need an exchange to use z-addresses, just receive into a one-use t, and then make it disappear into your main z-address yourself. Finally, you have to trust that AT LEAST ONE won't collude, because you need all pieces to fake Zcash, which is very different. Enough with this FUD. It's innovative tech, I expected HN to appreciate it more than the usual cryptocurrency circles. |
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Theres a good academic read about this here: https://lab.getmonero.org/pubs/MRL-0001.pdf and here: https://lab.getmonero.org/pubs/MRL-0004.pdf
And also a privacy improvement which gets into effect in about 25 hours or so with the next hardfork called RingCT, which has been peer reviewed by Ledger journal: http://www.ledgerjournal.org/ojs/index.php/ledger/article/do...
Optional privacy a la ZCASH is broken by design and cannot work, you are still able to have tainted coins and do blacklisting etc, its effectily useless, also it opens up a whole world of other attack vectors like this one: https://github.com/zcash/zcash/issues/1360#issuecomment-2461...
A good read for everyone unbiased tho a bit old is here (which explains the inner workings): https://lab.getmonero.org/pubs/MRL-0003.pdf