[wyager]

> Most of those regulations were put in place to protect communities and customers

I don't have much of an issue with communities using zoning rules to prevent AirBnBing. That's a separate issue from top-down hotel regulations.

The cost of "protecting" me from hotels is several orders of magnitude higher than the value I get from these "protections". Of course, most of the cost of hotel regulation is hotel taxes (which are big revenue sources for tourist destinations and have nothing to do with hotel safety) and bureaucracy. The claim that all regulations have something to do with safety is popular among proponents of a given regulation, but of course it's manifestly false.

> Safety and health regulations ensure that customers won't get injured or sick during their stay.

I think you're putting a bit too much stock in the effectiveness of regulation; in particular, municipal health authorities taking your money does not make you immune from disease. I'm also quite capable of looking at something and telling if it's dirty, which is the process I use both for my own household and for AirBnBs. It seems to work quite well (and inexpensively).

[ec109685]

It would be helpful to cite some of the things you are arguing. What basis do you base your opinion that hotel protections are several orders of magnitude than the value?

[wyager]

Out of curiosity, what do you expect me to do here? Would you like me to research your regional tax code and break down exactly why hotels are more expensive? Have you ever stayed in a hotel? They'll usually at least break out the obvious things like occupancy taxes.

[ec109685]

Just an example of your choice to show the multiple orders of magnitude that the regulation costs over your perceived value.

[digitaltrees]

If you die in a fire, that might feel like an order of magnitude greater than the $3 tax you could have paid. So even if you are right, that the total social cost of the tax exceeds the total harm of a few deaths, we as a society can determine that this is an acceptible trade off and spread the risk of a truly aweful outcome for 1 person over a larger group and impose a small cost on each.

Have you ever read the analysis Ford Motor Co. did when they were determining the cost of adding a safety feature to the Pinto (it would cost $11 to add a feature to prevent a low speed rear end collisions, as low as 25mile/hr from spraying gas into the passenger cabin and lighting everyone on fire, the total cost of the safety feature for all Pinto's: $140m, the cost of an expected number of 180 deaths, and 180 injury (and resulting law suit payments): $50m). In the absence of regulation or judicial liability (which is also a regulation, but one with more uncertain cost making it harder for businesses to plan for and comply with), companies would make this exact analysis all of the time.

I would assume you would be willing to pay $11 for the safety feature right? Thus, given the asymmetric information that benefits Ford, and prevents consumers from demanding that as a mandatory feature or an "upgrade" option, it seems like an acceptible regulation to impose.

See https://users.wfu.edu/palmitar/Law&Valuation/Papers/1999/Leg...)

See also https://philosophia.uncg.edu/phi361-metivier/module-2-why-do...

> "I think you are putting too much stock in the effectiveness of regulation..."

Except that clean water regulation very clearly prevents disease. Have you heard of the origin of clean water regulation in London? One researcher traced a cholera epidemic to a single well, city water services and related regulations were a direct result of his effort and advocacy.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/1854_Broad_Street_cholera_ou...

Before that, in 1849, 8,000 people died in NYC from cholera from water: https://dec.alaska.gov/eh/dw/publications/historic.html)

Last time I checked people aren't dying in NYC from unclean water. I am also confident that the utility of 8000 people dying greatly exceeds the cost of providing clean water.