[JshWright]

Verifying a downloaded file doesn't require a cryptographically secure hash function...

[aianus]

Of course it does, otherwise a malicious mirror can (theoretically) work to find a collision between their malware and the legitimate file and serve you the former.

There's no good reason not to use a secure hash function.

[JshWright]

If your threat model involves an attacker who is able to achieve a hash collision while still implanting a sophisticated malware, you should probably avoid downloading software from random websites...

[verbify]

It would be pretty impressive, as they'd need their malware to both do what they want and exactly match that hash. Not impossible, just clever.

[feld]

well it does require one that can't have collisions. otherwise what's the point in "verifying"?

[mschulze]

There is no hash function that can't have collisions by definition.

[feld]

*isn't known to have collisions, then