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by badsock
3480 days ago
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You absolutely have to trust the software and the hardware. Modifications at the hardware/OS level can deliberately misrepresent the voter input from the touch panel, and can then alter what is displayed on the screen to match what the voter expects. No matter how bulletproof the encryption protocol is, it still needs to be fed a choice via an analog, unencrypted channel because human beings are analog and unencrypted. If you control that channel, it's game over. And you can't get around that by having a system that enables people to verify their vote at a later time on a second (presumably unhacked) machine, because then you'll also enable the forcing of voters to prove that they've voted the way that they've been coerced to. |
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For example, chipTAN is commonly used in Germany to verify online banking. You have to trust the chip on the banking card and the card reader, but not your computer, network connection, or your smartphone.
A similar device may also work for online voting. The hardware would be simple enough to audit it. Your computer would never learn the vote.