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I don't mean to sound rude, but your comment shows how little you know understand about securities, investing, risk, and reward. Of course nobody comes in asking for "crappy mortgages". Pension funds, endowments, etc. have certain investing goals. These are typically set based on future obligations to their investors. Let's say for example that you are a portfolio manager at one of these institutions whose job is to achieve a 7.5% annual return because teachers, firemen, and police officers actually expect to get paid in retirement. Well, the first thing to note is that this isn't easy. The investors diversify their investments among stocks, hedge funds, fixed income (bonds), and yes - mortgage backed securities, based on where they think the best relative risk-reward is. Along the entire spectrum of assets, investors expect a much higher yield for what the market perceives to be a crappy asset as compared to a good asset. You can loan money to the US government at a 1% yield or you can load money to high grade corporate companies in the US for 5%. Why would you choose the "safe" US government vs. the relatively "crappy" high grade corporate securities? Well, it all depends on what yield (interest rate) you seek versus what risk you are willing to take. The investors who bought these securities were looking for a specific risk (and for the interest rate that they'd get for taking it) which was detailed very clearly in the offering memorandum (http://bit.ly/9zwBqB). Some specific lines I'll cite are as follows: -----Prior to making an investment decision, prospective investors should ensure that they have
sufficient knowledge, experience and access to professional advisors to make their own legal, tax,
accounting and financial evaluation of the merits and risks of investment in the Notes and should carefully
consider the nature of the Notes, the matters set forth elsewhere in this Offering Circular and the extent of
their exposure to the risks described in "Risk Factors".
-----Concentration Risk. The concentration of the Reference Obligations in the Reference Portfolio in
any one particular type of Structured Product Security subjects the Notes to a greater degree of risk with
respect to credit defaults within such type of Structured Product Security. Investors should review the list
of Reference Obligations set forth herein and conduct their own investigation and analysis with regard to
each Reference Obligation. See "The Credit Default Swap—The Reference Portfolio".
----- The Collateral Securities may include Commercial
Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities.
Mortgage-Backed Securities.
CMBS bear various risks, including credit, market, interest rate, structural and legal risks. CMBS
are securities backed by obligations (including certificates of participation in obligations) that are
principally secured by mortgages on real property or interests therein having a multifamily or commercial
use, such as regional malls, other retail space, office buildings, industrial or warehouse properties, hotels,
rental apartments, self-storage, nursing homes and senior living centers. Risks affecting real estate
investments include general economic conditions, the condition of financial markets, political events,
developments or trends in any particular industry and changes in prevailing interest rates. The cyclicality
and leverage associated with real estate-related investments have historically resulted in periods,
including significant periods, of adverse performance, including performance that may be materially more
adverse than the performance associated with other investments. In addition, commercial mortgage loans
generally lack standardized terms, tend to have shorter maturities than residential mortgage loans and
may provide for the payment of all or substantially all of the principal only at maturity. Additional risks may
be presented by the type and use of a particular commercial property. For instance, commercial
properties that operate as hospitals and nursing homes may present special risks to lenders due to the
significant governmental regulation of the ownership, operation, maintenance and financing of health care
institutions. Hotel and motel properties are often operated pursuant to franchise, management or
operating agreements which may be terminable by the franchisor or operator; and the transferability of a
hotel's operating, liquor and other licenses upon a transfer of the hotel, whether through purchase or
foreclosure, is subject to local law requirements. All of these factors increase the risks involved with
commercial real estate lending. Commercial lending is generally viewed as exposing a lender to a greater
risk of loss than residential one-to-four family lending since it typically involves larger loans to a single
borrower than residential one-to-four family lending.
Commercial mortgage lenders typically look to the debt service coverage ratio of a loan secured
by income-producing property as an important measure of the risk of default on such a loan. Commercial
property values and net operating income are subject to volatility, and net operating income may be
sufficient or insufficient to cover debt service on the related mortgage loan at any given time. The
repayment of loans secured by income-producing properties is typically dependent upon the successful
operation of the related real estate project rather than upon the liquidation value of the underlying real
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estate. Furthermore, the net operating income from and value of any commercial property may be
adversely affected by risks generally incident to interests in real property, including events which the
borrower or manager of the property, or the issuer or servicer of the related issuance of commercial
mortgage-backed securities, may be unable to predict or control, such as changes in general or local
economic conditions and/or specific industry segments; declines in real estate values; declines in rental
or occupancy rates; increases in interest rates, real estate tax rates and other operating expenses;
changes in governmental rules, regulations and fiscal policies; acts of God; and social unrest and civil
disturbances. The value of commercial real estate is also subject to a number of laws, such as laws
regarding environmental clean-up and limitations on remedies imposed by bankruptcy laws and state
laws regarding foreclosures and rights of redemption. Any decrease in income or value of the commercial
real estate underlying an issue of CMBS could result in cash flow delays and losses on the related issue
of CMBS.
A commercial property may not readily be converted to an alternative use in the event that the
operation of such commercial property for its original purpose becomes unprofitable. In such cases, the
conversion of the commercial property to an alternative use would generally require substantial capital
expenditures. Thus, if the borrower becomes unable to meet its obligations under the related commercial
mortgage loan, the liquidation value of any such commercial property may be substantially less, relative
to the amount outstanding on the related commercial mortgage loan, than would be the case if such
commercial property were readily adaptable to other uses. The exercise of remedies and successful
realization of liquidation proceeds may be highly dependent on the performance of CMBS servicers or
special servicers, of which there may be a limited number and which may have conflicts of interest in any
given situation. The failure of the performance of such CMBS servicers or special servicers could result in
cash flow delays and losses on the related issue of CMBS.
At any one time, a portfolio of CMBS may be backed by commercial mortgage loans with
disproportionately large aggregate principal amounts secured by properties in only a few states or
regions. As a result, the commercial mortgage loans may be more susceptible to geographic risks relating
to such areas, such as adverse economic conditions, adverse events affecting industries located in such
areas and natural hazards affecting such areas, than would be the case for a pool of mortgage loans
having more diverse property locations.
Mortgage loans underlying a CMBS issue may provide for no amortization of principal or may
provide for amortization based on a schedule substantially longer than the maturity of the mortgage loan,
resulting in a "balloon" payment due at maturity. If the underlying mortgage borrower experiences
business problems, or other factors limit refinancing alternatives, such balloon payment mortgages are
likely to experience payment delays or even default. As a result, the related issue of CMBS could
experience delays in cash flow and losses.
In addition, interest payments on CMBS may be subject to an available funds-cap and/or a
weighted average coupon cap (which cap will, in each case, have the practical effect of deferring part or
all of such interest payments) if interest rate rises substantially.
Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities. The Reference Obligations will include and the
Collateral Securities may include Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities.
RMBS bear various risks, including credit, market, interest rate, structural and legal risks. RMBS
represent interests in pools of residential mortgage loans secured by one- to four-family residential
mortgage loans. Such loans may be prepaid at any time. Residential mortgage loans are obligations of
the borrowers thereunder only and are not typically insured or guaranteed by any other person or entity,
although such loans may be securitized by Agencies and the securities issued are guaranteed. The rate
of defaults and losses on residential mortgage loans will be affected by a number of factors, including
general economic conditions and those in the area where the related mortgaged property is located, the
borrower's equity in the mortgaged property and the financial circumstances of the borrower. If a
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residential mortgage loan is in default, foreclosure of such residential mortgage loan may be a lengthy
and difficult process, and may involve significant expenses. Furthermore, the market for defaulted
residential mortgage loans or foreclosed properties may be very limited.
At any one time, a portfolio of RMBS may be backed by residential mortgage loans with
disproportionately large aggregate principal amounts secured by properties in only a few states or
regions. As a result, the residential mortgage loans may be more susceptible to geographic risks relating
to such areas, such as adverse economic conditions, adverse events affecting industries located in such
areas and natural hazards affecting such areas, than would be the case for a pool of mortgage loans
having more diverse property locations. In addition, the residential mortgage loans may include so-called
"jumbo" mortgage loans, having original principal balances that are higher than is generally the case for
residential mortgage loans. As a result, such portfolio of RMBS may experience increased losses.
Each underlying residential mortgage loan in an issue of RMBS may have a balloon payment due
on its maturity date. Balloon residential mortgage loans involve a greater risk to a lender than self-
amortizing loans, because the ability of a borrower to pay such amount will normally depend on its ability
to obtain refinancing of the related mortgage loan or sell the related mortgaged property at a price
sufficient to permit the borrower to make the balloon payment, which will depend on a number of factors
prevailing at the time such refinancing or sale is required, including, without limitation, the strength of the
residential real estate markets, tax laws, the financial situation and operating history of the underlying
property, interest rates and general economic conditions. If the borrower is unable to make such balloon
payment, the related issue of RMBS may experience losses.
In addition, interest payments on RMBS may be subject to an available funds-cap and/or a
weighted average coupon cap (which cap will, in each case, have the practical effect of deferring part or
all of such interest payments) if interest rate rises substantially. Note also Schedule A which LISTS EVERY SECURITY IN THE CDO. With a document like this (which is required), it is very difficult for someone to make a credible claim that GS did not forward appropriate info as to to what the buyer was actually investing in. These investors took a risk. They knew they were taking a risk and they knew the risk they were taking - these weren't mom and pop retail investors, but some of the most professional in the business. The simple fact is that they did a poor job of assessing risk versus reward and lost a ton of money as a result. Again, when you go into a McDonalds, nobody says, "please give me unhealthy food", but instead they say, "give me a double quarter-pounder with cheese". This person is taking the risk of heart disease versus the "reward" of enjoying a calorific sandwich. They know the risk they're taking and have free will to take that risk. It was the same with these investors, only now it's as if they're suing McDonalds after having a heart attack. |
Can we apply this metaphor to the Goldman mortgage backed securities? Well, how many mortgages were wrapped up in those securities? Was there anyway to be sure what the security would be worth under various scenarios? I saw an article that Python was being considered as a language for specifying derivatives, so you could just run the program and know what the payouts would be under various scenarios with no ambiguity. Was there an expectation that Goldman was doing the work of picking securities with a certain risk profile, when in actuality they were picking securities with a higher risk profile?
It seems to me that a general principle of the law should be that a seller who intentionally misrepresents what they are selling has some measure of liability. Do you disagree, or do you feel that no misrepresentation occurred in this case?