| > Nothing is secure from all known threats. Of course. That's why it's important to reduce the attack surface. Adding electronics (or worse, software) adds a huge amount of attack surface. The attack could be at any point from the CPU-internals to the software. > the voting protocol doesn't provide a means of verification Yes. That's a feature. Any new system cannot re-enable voter coercion. > Homomorphic encryption I already mentioned[1] that video yesterday. It's an interesting idea, but even Prof. Rivest in the video isn't claiming it's ready for use. More importantly, the reply by marten-de-vries[2] brings up a very good counter argument to any voting system based on fancy math: the general population won't accept it. The voting process doesn't work unless the population considers it legitimate, and it will be hard to convince them if they first have to learn enough math to understand homomorphic (or public-key) encryption. This is still interesting research that may evolve into a new type of voting protocol in the future. [1] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=13020917 [2] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=13021517 |
You're missing the point. The voting protocol is built in such a way that you can verify that your vote was cast as intended, and that your vote was counted in the tally. Once everyone agrees on the voting protocol you don't need to trust someone else's electronics, you can do it on your own device, and use open source software.
> the voting protocol doesn't provide a means of verification Yes. That's a feature. Any new system cannot re-enable voter coercion.
You can have vote verification without enabling coercion. If you have a vote receipt it does not imply you can prove or disprove how you voted, but it does allow you to verify that your vote was included in the tally.
> More importantly, the reply by marten-de-vries[2] brings up a very good counter argument to any voting system based on fancy math: the general population won't accept it. The voting process doesn't work unless the population considers it legitimate, and it will be hard to convince them if they first have to learn enough math to understand homomorphic (or public-key) encryption.
I disagree. The general population doesn't know how RSA or AES work but we have HTTPS and the green-lock-thingy. You don't need to know how or why something works in order to reap its benefits.