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> One point that it looks like Curry takes aim with more generally is the degree to which there is a consensus about global warming among scientists. She says that 97% of scientists can't believe in it because they haven't studied it or built their own models, etc -- they have "second order belief" In the post below, her primary complaint about the 97% stat is that it doesn't specify the amount of climate change that those people attributed to humans: "After discarding the abstracts that were judged to have taken no position, Cook (2013) reported a 97% consensus that anthropogenic GHGs were causing global warming. However, three-fourths of that consensus was judged to be implied and more than 98% of the agreement was expressed non-quantitatively. Consequently, no widespread consensus exists in these abstracts that humans are responsible for most of the global warming; only that humans are responsible for an unspecified amount of global warming." https://judithcurry.com/2015/12/20/what-is-there-a-97-consen... I think the 97% stat provides a useful opportunity for those of us who would like to get to truth of the matter but haven't studied climatology and have no interest in spending years studying the subject just to determine the truth of this particular issue. So much of the argument about the subject is "they're wrong, I'm right" followed by technical explanation that you cannot tell who to trust. But you can understand how the 97% claim was reached. It provides a useful opportunity to gauge who to trust on the subject, although admittedly still requires careful consideration and more time that most will commit. This John Stuart Mill quote seems apt: "People more happily situated, who sometimes hear their opinions disputed, and are not wholly unused to be set right when they are wrong, place the same unbounded reliance only on such of their opinions as are shared by all who surround them, or to whom they habitually defer: for in proportion to a man's want of confidence in his own solitary judgement, does he usually repose, with implicit trust, on the infallibility of "the world" in general. And the world, to each individual, means the part of it with which he comes in contact; his party, his sect, his church, his class of society: the man may be called, by comparison, almost liberal and large-minded to whom it means anything so comprehensive as his own country or his own age. Nor is his faith in his collective authority at all shaken by his being aware that other ages, countries, sects, churches, classes, and parties have thought, and even now think, the exact reverse. He develops upon his own world the responsibility of being in the right against the dissentient worlds of other people; and it never troubles him that mere accident has decided which of these numerous worlds is the object of his reliance, and that the same cause which make him a Churchman in London, would have made him a Buddhist or a Confucian in Pekin." |