[mSparks]

cant be any worse than openssl.

they have all code running in constant time from the alpha version.

Next comes making sure there are no buffer overflows. the code is stable and compatible.

If everyone leaves it to someone else who does it exactly?

Obviously not ready for use in production until its been audited.

Remind me again where i can download an audited ssl implimentation?

[BillinghamJ]

> cant be any worse than openssl.

Not sure I'd agree with that. OpenSSL is very far from perfect and obviously contains many many security bugs, but it also has a very long history of fixes, knowledge, etc. and has a large number of eyes on it. It's more of a known quantity than something new.

[wbl]

OpenSSL does not have half the fixes people think it does. Generally what gets fixed is the ciphersuites some people happen to use, and the rest remain broken. For example, the constant time ECDSA signing only works with some curves, not all. It still supports horrific hacks for random number generation, instead of using OS provided interfaces. NSS is not much better on this front, but does a far better job of parsing TLS records in a sane way.

[mSparks]

well. actually looks better from the start:

There is not a single malloc() call in all the library. In fact, the whole of BearSSL requires only memcpy(), memmove(), memcmp() and strlen() from the underlying C library. This makes it utterly portable even in the most special, OS-less situations. (On “big” systems, BearSSL will automatically use a couple more system calls to access the OS-provided clock and random number generator.)

On big desktop and server OS, this feature still offers an interesting characteristic: immunity to memory leaks and memory-based DoS attacks. Outsiders cannot make BearSSL allocate megabytes of RAM since BearSSL does not actually know how to allocate RAM at all.