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by Kalium
3533 days ago
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You're right! Completely, absolutely, 100% right. If this was a plausible attack vector, we could see it used now. And you know what? We do! This is why some people are concerned about technical decisions that make this vector more dangerous. Systems that attack by, say, injecting DNS responses already exist and are deployed in real life. The NSA has one - Quantum. Why make the cache poisoning worse? |
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If my adversary can steal an IP from Facebook, create a valid certificate for facebook.com, and provide bogus DNS resolution for facebook.com, I feel it's game over for me. My home network is forfeit to such an adversary.
But I get your point. It's about layering on mitigating factors. The lower the TTL, the lower the exposure. Still, my current calculus is that the risk of being attacked by such an adversary is fairly low (well, I sure hope so), and I would personally like to configure my local caching resolver to hold onto last-known-good resolutions for a while.
All that said, I have to hand it to you and others like you, those whom keep the needle balanced between security and convenience.