[TheBobinator]

Implementing an official Bump-in-the-wire MITM method for TLS would be the final nail in the coffin of the protocol; nobody would take it seriously and would move onto IPSEC.

If big business needs to secure communications in and out of the enterprise, then they need to stop being lazy about it. Tap the endpoints and use internet proxies, block communications with unapproved websites, and install surveillance gear in the conference rooms. I get these are costly measures, but they are only costly because of input cost to get there, not operating cost.

Want to know how you get a gargantuan database out of any company? Ship it out the firewall through a client PC as a H.323 video stream through your favorite software package. You tell me how to filter that one on a modern, carrier grade Pal-Alto firewall? We have tremendous holes in the existing infrastructure because we don't want to put the work into actual security or into fundamental theory.

The bias here is the market should slow down for big business, the reality is, big business not being on the ball and putting pressure for changes on a protocol like this is a tremendous subsidy to those companies. Frankly, public sediment is right in this case, the big businesses should bare the brunt and cost of their mistakes.

[cmdrfred]

I agree, this isn't a low margin business either. We are talking about inferior security for all internet users for the sake of Well Fargo's quarterly report.

[cryptarch]

I really like "public sediment"!

Thank you for the eggcorn.

[uola]

> [...] nobody would take it seriously and would move onto IPSEC.

Sounds good to me.