[skybrian]

True, but not necessarily that important. In world of Bitcoin this is important due to anonymity and criminal activity.

In a regulated industry there are other ways to prevent cheating. Making cheating obvious and undeniable is probably enough to prevent it from happening (due to legal risk).

[kpil]

In the context of banks, where there are a limited set of semi-trusted entities and multiple trusted third-parties, I seems that most most solutions to prevent cheating offers is either really similar to a trusted third party solution, or offers no major benefits, but comes with many drawbacks.

In cash transactions, it's hard to beat the speed of a trusted third party with a deposited "float" for ensuring that you can pay at the end of the day - even a bad day where a part defaults.

In securities, there is perhaps some room for a blockchain solution, as the infrastructure is much more complex and underdeveloped - due to the historically gigantic margins.

[jcoffland]

If a private blockchain forks how do you decide which one was the cheaters branch and which one legit?

[wmf]

The legit branch is signed/vouched by at least (N/2)+1 parties and the cheating branch has less than (N/2)-1.

[jcoffland]

So groups of banks get to vote on what is true or not. How could that ever fail. /s

[petra]

If that is viewed as a failure-mode before deployment, they can add servers at neutral bodies like courts, etc.