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Consider the following: What type of world would ours be if everybody tortured cats for fun? Intuitively speaking, would that be a "good" world, or at least one that is more "moral" than our current one? Morality itself may not be universal in the same way that protons and neutrons are - it's unlikely that CERN will ever find a fundamental particle that interacts with humans to produce moral behavior. That being said, it isn't necessarily impossible to conceive of a (universal, consistent, intuitive) code whose rules maximize some moral good[1] (whether that good is pleasure, longevity, number of M&Ms per capita, etc). We can argue back and forth about whether moral goods are social or universal (I personally think that it depends on the moral good being considered), but neither option seems to detract from the core calculus of moral philosophy - whether or not someone ought to do something. If that fundamental question resonates with you, then you've just made a moral consideration. The trick then is to understand why you've made that consideration, whether or not it is a consistent one, and what first principles inspire it. If you think that question doesn't resonate with you, you might be an amoralist[2]. [1]: I apologize for re-using "good" here - I'm using it in the sense of resources, not the moral sense. In the context of (utilitarian) moral philosophy, moral goods are those resources that we ought to maximize. [2]: Bernard Williams has written very extensively on amoralism, and particularly on the inconsistencies that amoralists must concede upon being presented with their own behavior. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy and Morality: An Introduction to Ethics both contain great passages/chapters on amoralism and its inviability as a philosophical model. |