[a3_nm]

For 2), the standard "ship of Theseus" argument applies: progressively replace your brain by parts which are emulated. Initially you are you, at the end of the process you are uploaded. When did your "subjective experience" change?

The notion of the continuity of consciousness is not well-defined, so I don't think we have any idea about whether brain uploads can make sense or not. But I don't see why it's obvious that they wouldn't.

[astazangasta]

It's not the brain that I'm worried about losing, it's the body. The ship of Theseus imagines I am replacing parts with nigh-indistinguishable parts. There is a fundamental difference in going from squishy biology to program in the cloud. I'm not even sure it's possible for a machine to have a subjective experience like a human's without the squishy meat parts, and I doubt we'll learn enough to emulate those parts successfully for a good while. I'm pretty attached to my hands and face and would probably be very unhappy if I lost them.