[invisible]

I guess I should re-evaluate why the information is secret and attempt to explain why the information is secret to the concerned individual before it's released. I guess that is a slippery slope, but I do not really understand the need for classification of any past air strikes that do not involve future missions.

[lotharbot]

There's already a procedure for evaluating classification of information, a built-in system for declassifying things after a particular period of time, and procedures for whistle blowers to follow when something is inappropriately classified or merely inappropriate. ("Alert the media" or "leak this to wikileaks" is, generally, a very-very-very last resort.)

I don't understand the classification of past missile strikes, but I'd bet someone who knows the list of classification criteria could explain it. (Or, if it's inappropriately classified, challenge it through the proper channels.)

[invisible]

And what happens if that system fails because those that declassify are the ones that have agendas to not release this information?

[lotharbot]

As posted above:

("Alert the media" or "leak this to wikileaks" is, generally, a very-very-very last resort.)

[ytinas]

After you've already tried all the other channels? Then you're no longer an anonymous whistle blower.

[lotharbot]

After somebody has tried the other channels. Doesn't have to be the same person.

[lotharbot]

I was just reminded of one example: if "they" knew that we knew such-and-such detail about an airstrike, they might (1) be able to identify our method for intel gathering, or (2) be able to identify our source, which would get our spy killed.

It's the same principle as "loose lips sink ships". Sometimes harmless-looking individual details are actually the key to keeping our guys safe in hostile environments.

[ytinas]

None of this has anything to do with Wikileaks. They are exposing things that are obvious cases of corruption. How are we helping the largely imaginary terrorists if we expose a CIA murder cover up?

[lotharbot]

"They are exposing things that are obvious cases of corruption."

1) Are you sure that's all they're exposing? 2) Are you sure none of their employees are passing things that don't meet those criteria on to other intel agencies, even if they don't put them on the official server? 3) Are you sure that, when they expose corruption, they're appropriately sanitizing incidental details that might otherwise get our spies killed etc.?

It's tremendously dangerous for a group that does not have a strong intelligence-analysis background to expose classified material. From what I've seen, they simply don't have the process in place to appropriately handle the material they're working with.