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by throwanem
3642 days ago
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You're conflating a well-secured email server administered in conjunction with State's infosec team - which I agree would be perfectly reasonable from a security perspective - and what actually obtained in the case at hand. You're also conflating the responsibilities of State Department personnel with regard to information classified by the government they've sworn to serve, and the responsibilities of other nations' diplomatic personnel with regard to information originating in the government of a state foreign to them. Neither seems especially conducive to a useful discussion of the matter at hand. |
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More to the point, shadow IT exists for a reason. Taken out of the context of the State Department and the political sphere, this was classic shadow IT. I've used shadow IT, and I've provided shadow IT, because I've worked a lot in large, sluggish bureaucracies, and that's How Things Get Done sometimes. "Security" becomes a catch-all excuse for laziness and cowardice.
If she felt like she could do her job with the existing State Department tools, she wouldn't have set up a shadow IT operation, period. It's not like she's completely ignorant of either operational security or political ramifications. To do this, she must have felt thoroughly hampered by the existing system.