[ryao]

Kernels do as well. Both have had security exploits that lead to privilege escalation. As containerization matures, I expect the security of a container host to become similar to that of a hypervisor. They are essentially doing the same thing. The only place on which they differ is the kind of abstraction that they use.

LPARs/LDOMs are a much more secure abstraction for "sharing resources among potentially hostile customers". Those physically partition at the hardware. LPARs are used on the IBM mainframes and are "EAL5 Certified". LDOMs are the SPARC equivalent, but I do not know their EAL. Both traditional kernels and various hypervisors are EAL 4 (some are called EAL4+), which is not as secure.

[lifty]

I don't think kernels are inherently less secure than hypervisors, but as they stand, current hypervisor implementations have a better security track record than kernels. The basic point that I am trying to make is that both hypervisors and kernels are just pieces of software meant for partitioning and sharing hardware. Software that has simpler and smaller interfaces also has a lower probability of having bugs that lead to vulnerabilities. I agree that that there are better hardware partitioning implementations out there but unfortunately they are not so popular. I am looking forward to having formally verified kernels like seL4 become more popular.

[eru]

Kernels usually provide quite a lot of abstraction in addition to secure partitioning and sharing. And that's arguably wrong: providing abstractions is complicated (thus inherently less secure), and one size does not fit all.

In a unikernel setup abstractions can live much more comfortably in libraries.

[reiger]

IBM terminology might be confusing me - but looking at published security targets it appears LPAR's themselves have only ever been evaluated at EAL4 with flaw remediation (ALC 2) and PR/SM being evaluated at EAL 5 but neither to any specific protection profile. This means that IBM created their own evaluations and gave themselves a "certification".

Protection profile less CC evaluations are worthless in the eyes of most governments and CC schemes, but kudos to IBM product management and marketing for creating competitive FUD.

As of a year ago LDOM's (Oracle VM for SPARC) hasn't had a CC evaluation and I'm not seeing anything currently in evaluation. Solaris Zones have been evaluated under the Solaris OSPP EAL4 + extensions evaluation.

The biggest reason that virtualization technologies haven't had a CC evaluation with a protection profile is that no US NIAP approved protection profile existed and the draft ones that were circulated were crap.

Assurance levels (EAL) are deprecated for newest NIAP protection profiles as the higher assurance levels (EAL4) were cost and time prohibited for vendors to complete before the product was outdated. Many people wrongly think common criteria is a security evaluation (free of bugs) - it's not - it's a security architecture evaluation (is the documented behavior working correctly).

There is a schism in CC - everything is changing - anything we know today is wrong and will change.

TL;DR: Common Criteria is a joke and doesn't actual mean what you think it does.