[DelaneyM]

> Is there any possible token-based authentication scheme that is both stateless (ie. no round trip to the database on every call) AND invalidate-able?

I suspect this is provably impossible.

There are all sorts of things you can do at the protocol/platform level if you have a shared secret, but with only the constraints of an open authentication scheme you lack the tools to do this.

[gcommer]

If you're willing to delve into the fun world of CRLs you can sorta do it. This isn't truly stateless of course, but for some design constraints it could be "practically" stateless since you're eliminating auth server round trips, which is probably why you were aiming for statelessness in the first place.

CRLs of course introduce lots of replication complexity and timing bounds to consider, and you probably want to pair them with short lived tokens to keep the CRL size manageable. (and then delve into refresh tokens)

As the OP points at, you most likely don't need any of this.

[merb]

Eventually JWT has very little Roundtrips.

Our current Implementation is:

- Really short lived JWT of 1 minute - If the JWT is invalid and the user didn't do a request in the last minute it does query the database for a session token (we use session tokens and jwt). if the Token is inside the database/redis/ehcache/whatever the user gets still a new JWT token.

Actually we did that since we needed a "sane" way of revoking tokens fast but still keep the user logged in until the browser is closed.

We don't have a mobile client (yet) but I guess we try to do something like that, too. just not with a session. This works really well and mostly our users won't hang around for more than a minute and when they do its not a problem to have a single backend call.