[woodman]

Part of the whole security clearance process is instruction on detecting misclassification, so the :%s/SECRET/SUCRETS/g defense doesn't work. At least 22 emails where later classified as top secret, there is no way to mistake top secret material for uncontrolled information. There were at least 22 chances to take a step back and wonder about the wisdom of the thing.

[jonwachob91]

Lets not forget the handful (I don't recall the exact number) of emails that Colin Powell sent from his personal account and had clearance adjustments later on. Or the number of Rice's staff who received emails to their personal accounts that were deemed classified after the fact. Lots of chances for many individuals in the IC to step back and develop better procedures. Lets not put ALL the blame on Hillary.

[woodman]

Do we need to preface every discussion with a list of others' bad behavior? I imagine that would distract for the topic under discussion... and you wouldn't want to do that would you?

[jonwachob91]

Well, we could be superficial and only talk about Hillary. OR, and this is crazy but stay with me, we could talk about how this issue happened way back in the early 2000's and no one at the NSA/House addressed the issue then.

A lot of people failed on this issue long before Hillary.

[ldness]

Congress addressed the issue of security of government servers more generally by passing the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) in 2002. Her use of a rouge external server violates this law on every level. Clinton's predecessors have the defense that their terms preceded this law.

[woodman]

Why stop in the early 2000's? Surely this is all superficial if we avoid the real issue - the control of privileged information! It should be obvious how unproductive this line of thinking is, eventually we'd find ourselves debating the original sin of man.