[dctoedt]

Seems like unwarranted either-or binary thinking: Either we're totally in control of ourselves, or we have no control at all. I suspect that doesn't square with most people's personal experiences.

(Cf. Paul's letter to the Romans: "I do not understand what I do. For what I want to do I do not do, but what I hate I do." [1] )

One problem might lie in the nomenclature. The term "free will" is simply wrong. And it's not like "sunrise," which is likewise wrong but for everyday purposes the error is harmless.

[1] Romans 7.15, https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Romans+7:15-20

[zaque1213]

> Either we're totally in control of ourselves, or we have no control at all.

Maybe I missed it, but it seems the author of the article makes no distinction between natural and moral inability. Jonathan Edwards, in his work Freedom of the Will, puts forth the idea that a man chained to a chair is not morally unable to get up from the chair, but he is naturally unable.

The author mentions that a day laborer with no belief in free will are perhaps more likely to show up to work late. I don't necessarily doubt that's true, but they still bear moral responsibility. Unless he broke his leg on the way to work or something like that, there is no natural inability to be on time.

In the same vein, if an otherwise gentle and courteous person develops a brain condition that causes anger violent behavior, that is owing to a natural inability, not a moral one.

> The term "free will" is simply wrong. And it's not like "sunrise," which is likewise wrong but for everyday purposes the error is harmless.

I agree with you. Again, Edwards would state that our will is determined by our mind. We will to do whatever our mind finds most desirable at any given moment. The laborer who is consistently late to work desires an extra few moments on his couch at home more than the virtue of fulfilling his commitment to his boss. But in the absence of any natural inability, he bears moral responsibility for that choice.

You mentioned Paul's letter to the Romans. Paul is assuming a natural inability to do the right thing, which it seems to me he also assumes to be a moral inability. I suppose the question to be answered here is whether the desires of our mind are captive to natural forces, such as cause and effect, or whether have complete agency over our minds. Or both.

[taneq]

I think this distinction between 'moral' and 'natural' inability is an artificial one. The only difference is where, between the chair and the center of the man's mind, the chains are fastened.

[aaron-santos]

For a few years, I've considered the hot hand experiment[1] somewhat of a free will test in the sense that if our choices are not a function of the past then we should have the ability to fake coin flips. It supports idea of free will being a continuum because the answer to the runs test is the probability that the data was faked - never a definite yes or no.

[1] - http://math.williams.edu/the-hot-hand/

[stouset]

I don't follow your logic. The question of whether or not we have free will is independent of the question of whether or not events from the past influence our decision-making process, which seems to be unquestionably true.