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by nickpsecurity
3700 days ago
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I'm glad you're saying it, too, as I get tired of this myth. I wrote a scheme on Schneier's blog for disproving it a while back. Basically, you counter the mitigations which look awfully similar to the one's that got countered in Linux and Windows. Once you have that, wait until a bug is mentioned on mailing list that can lead to memory attack. Weaponize it. Profit. Leads me to what I claim is dirty secret behind "only 2 holes in..." claim they have: OpenBSD just fixes bugs they find without serious attempts to determine if they'd be exploitable vulnerabilities. They just do accounting differently than the rest. So, by their numbers, they only had 2 vulnerabilities because they didn't assess whether other bugs were vulnerabilities in the first place. They have good code quality but they're full of shit about how vulnerable it is or isn't. |
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Security problems are usually clearly marked in the changelog: http://www.openbsd.org/errata59.html
What really annoys me with OpenBSD is that users are expected to download the CVS source and compile it to fix problems rather than upgrade to a dot-release.
For a normal user that's fine, but if you have a bunch of servers you'll need a sophisticated build/deploy infrastructure to stay updated.