| No need for the rudeness. I always get bothered when people bring up the `curl [...] | bash`
“argument” (which is usually less of an argument and more of a rude
dismissal of a good product). Sure, the script downloaded with curl should be validated. Not sure, but I’m pretty sure you don’t validate every tarball you
download, and even if you do validate them, you certainly wouldn’t look
through each line of code making sure there isn’t a backdoor or something. Any malicious person could break into a tarball download site, and
replace the checksums as well (only way to mitigate that is using a
signature that is associated with the tarball maintainer), and even if
something like PGP is used, the attacker would be able to replace the
instructions to obtain the PGP key with their own generated one, or
even remove the signature completely. This is, of course, the same for curl piped into bash, but my point is
that it’s only slightly worse than an unsecured package site (which
I’m sure there are many of). The only thing worse about it is that
it’s less noticeable when the script has been replaced. Also, some scripts (such as the rvm installatio script) /require/ PGP
to be used for the installation to even start. In conclusion, please don’t be rude and dismiss an entire product
because of a single installation method, which isn’t actually worse
than a malicious tarball. |
Why? Package managers were created for a reason. Virtually every Linux distribution anyone would use to host a service such as Sandstorm will include a package manager.
> Not sure, but I’m pretty sure you don’t validate every tarball you download, and even if you do validate them, you certainly wouldn’t look through each line of code making sure there isn’t a backdoor or something.
I don't download tarballs. I install packages. Who downloads tarballs to install software in 2016?
Anyone actively developing for a project will likely be using git, and I'm not aware of too many projects which make use of toolchains which are so new that they're not available in any rolling release/testing distro.
> Any malicious person could break into a tarball download site, and replace the checksums as well (only way to mitigate that is using a signature that is associated with the tarball maintainer), and even if something like PGP is used, the attacker would be able to replace the instructions to obtain the PGP key with their own generated one, or even remove the signature completely.
Yes, fine. And that's why all major distributions sign their packages, so you know that it's valid. Again, it's 2016, who seriously installs software from tarballs?
> The only thing worse about it is that it’s less noticeable when the script has been replaced.
No, what is much worse than that is you are installing software outside of your package manager. Also, companies who deploy via curl | bash, typically pull in their own dependencies outside of the package manager.
It's bad form.
If your application has specific dependencies, then ship it as an appliance using LXC, Docker, or $TRENDY_CONTAINER_TECH. That way, all updates are atomic and you don't risk eff-ing the OS by pulling in a bunch of stuff outside of the package manager.
> In conclusion, please don’t be rude and dismiss an entire product because of a single installation method, which isn’t actually worse than a malicious tarball.
In conclusion, package management is a solved problem. Companies which have installers which do not make use of the distribution's package management system are lazy, and anyone who defends curl | bash is an apologist.
Seriously, it's not difficult to generate a DEB/RPM/<insert distribution package format> and create your own signed repo. Package management has been a solved problem for at least a decade.
It annoys me that companies think it's okay to have curl | bash as an installation method. If they think that will ever be acceptable in an enterprise environment where change management is important, they're delusional.