[faded242]

Almost always someone who doesn't understand BGP making a mistake in conjunction with an upstream provider that is incompetent enough to not have prefix filtering in place to avoid putting bad prefixes out into the global routing table. Though, sometimes it certainly is malicious, and impossible to protect against. If someone hijacks your prefix, you basically have to start trying to call all of the upstream networks to see if they can fix it.

[kijiki]

Or start announcing more specific routes.

If you have a /20, and some jackass starts announcing it, you announce 2 /21s instead.

You're screwed if you only have a /24, though, since everyone will filter /25s.

[cft]

This is not my specialty, but isn't that the point of radb registration to protect from route hijacking? When we implemented BGP DDoS mitigation with Verisign, we had to register them with radb for our /22 or smaller, so that they could announce on our behalf.

[asdfaoeu]

That's what he's alluding to with route prefixing but it'd unfortunately less than universal.

[walrus01]

Sort of like when Pakistan's PTCL hijacked YouTube.