[symtos]

Using binaries provided by Mozilla is not a good idea (unless they do things differently with the snaps). They are not hardened in any way; ie. no PIE (rendering ASLR pretty much useless), no stack canaries, no relro, ..., making it a lot easier to exploit any given sec-related bug.

  $ hardening-check ./firefox
  ./firefox:
   Position Independent Executable: no, normal executable!
   Stack protected: no, not found!
   Fortify Source functions: no, only unprotected functions found!
   Read-only relocations: no, not found!
   Immediate binding: no, not found!

Absolutely ridiculous given the amount of vulns likely to linger in its codebase.

It should also be noted that Firefox is one of the few packages that Canonical keeps aligned with Mozilla releases (even 12.04 LTS has the latest firefox), and:

  $ hardening-check /usr/lib/firefox/firefox
  /usr/lib/firefox/firefox:
   Position Independent Executable: yes
   Stack protected: yes
   Fortify Source functions: yes (some protected functions found)
   Read-only relocations: yes
   Immediate binding: yes

[cat-dev-null]

More "innovations" which "justify" their own existence with novelty, but eliminate useful properties, backward compatibility, interoperability and standards with blissful ignorance. Standardization is a Good Thing(TM)... many formats creates a confusing dependency hell across multiple systems. Deb/apt works well. This will be deprecated in 6 months after a major security incident. Canonical is mismanaged and capricious, and this is just another in a long line of examples.