| I don't agree with whoever downvoted your post; it contributes to the discussion. > The NSA itself knows very well that if the gizmos they provide aren't usable What isn't usable about a desktop computer? According to the article, she just liked using BBs more. Confusingly, the article seems to conflate a few things. 1. She wanted to use her Unclassified//SBU Blackberry in the SCIF. Because of phone exploits that the NSA employs against other heads of state [1], State Department guidelines require her to leave it outside of her office that has classified computers. Obama's special Blackberry might let him talk to DNC leadership and big donors, but I'm guessing he uses a normal phone for that. Why couldn't she use a desktop phone and her unclassified computer to check her email to donors, campaign managers, and DNC leadership? How does a separate email server solve this problem? 2. She felt the need to have a separate email server. What this solves is never mentioned in the article. All State Department employees have access to the Unclassified network. Most have access to State Department provided Blackberries for that network, and also to 2FA token generators to permit them to VPN in. Traveling all over the world doesn't restrict the usage of either of these. Also, DSS sets up a classified network wherever the Sec State stays. The only plausible reason to set up this outside email server is to evade FOIA and discuss classified topics without the risk of a government employee seeing classified information on an unclassified network. I'm really trying to understand any other reason to do this. [1] I didn't see a Blackberry exploit in the Snowden leaks, but it's probably safe to assume that the risk is significant. Imagine how valuable it would be to get room audio of political or trade discussions before stepping into a meeting with the U.S. Secretary of State. |