"We cannot trust you to use this power responsibly and therefore refuse to delegate it to you" might be the most rational basis for public policy there is.
The power to collect evidence to resolve criminal cases is one of the most fundamental powers of the state. You might just as productively suggest that we can't trust the USG to be a responsible state, and therefore it should disband.
The argument has the exact same form as the advice "don't talk to the police without a lawyer", and for the laws that support this protocol (right to silence/counsel). That is,
"I don't trust you to be an impartial seeker of the truth who's 'only' concerned with solving this murder rather than railroading me on random charges, therefore I will not answer even simple questions that you deem necessary to conduct your investigation."
(With that said, I really, really don't like the whole "don't talk to police" circlej---, like how it gets overapplied or dangerously applied ... but within a very narrow interpretation it's correct and well accepted enough to carry the implications over here.)
Edit: Correspondingly, the advice would carry a lot less weight in counties with a much better government that actually could be trusted not to look for petty reasons to arrest people. And so a government that prices itself a better steward of privacy could be trusted with key escrow.
You mean the 4th Amendment (the 5th guarantees due process and prohibits coerced self-testimony).
Put aside for a second that 4A is not in play here, because the phone's real owners consent to the search.
4A delegates to the courts the power to determine what evidence is and isn't in-bounds in an investigation. Nowhere in 4A will you find a prohibition on imaging someone's phone. Assuming the judiciary approves of a warrant, virtually nothing is out of bounds to a warranted search. That's what we're talking about here: a search that a judge has authorized.
It's that power that we're talking about clawing back because of a loss of trust in the government. And what I'm saying is, it's pretty silly to pretend that you can claw back the power to collect evidence without calling the whole state into question.
No, I meant the 5th amendment and coerced self-testimomy.
To me, that's an obvious example of evidence the government would like to have in many cases, but we clearly decided it cannot. A judge cannot grant a warrant compelling an individual to waive their 5A rights. That seems to have direct bearing on the idea of providing individuals a right to strong personal encryption.
Admittedly, there are many edge cases (furnishing information about a third party that one has personally encrypted), but we've bounded what the government can and cannot have before.
Although from another comment I made I generally agree with your position that this is a pretty serious point of balance between the individual and the state due to the nature of encryption.
That's the exception that proves the rule. So concerned were we about torture that we constitutionally prohibited coerced self-testimony. What other form of search does the constitution bar from judges? You can't say "the unreasonable kind!", because the constitutional definition of "reasonable" is "whatever the Supreme Court says it is".
I don't think limiting searches categorically has ever been a problem to this extent before (big statement, but maybe?). Because there's never been a broadly-used impediment to the types of searches the government typically conducts that simultaneously requires a sacrice on the part of individuals if it is not available.
Or to turn it around, what has the government historically desired to legally do after obtaining a warrant that it has been unable to do?
We never made locks or strong doors illegal. The closest would probably be mandating log retention at telecom providers for a certain period of time.
Correct, however we're entering into an entirely different area of argument here. Historically, physical safeguards have been utilized, and any physical safeguard can be overcome give a moderate amount of funding and/or time. I'm not aware of any period where a safeguard would need to be intentionally fundamentally flawed in order to allow the government to proceed with their collection of evidence.
The question becomes whether it is within the power of the government to mandate that flaw, or whether they will need to find some other approach. There is also a question of freedom of speech, as it has historically been held that you can be forced to not express something, however you cannot be forced to express something. In regards to key signing, it could be said that that is an expression of authenticity that you endorse whatever is being signed. Can the government force you to give that endorsement? Does the government's power to collect evidence supercede your right to freedom of speech (or the abdication of speech)?
The physical vs virtual component is the most fascinating part of the issue for me. And the fact that "make a virtual thing that behaves like the previous physical thing" is impossible / extremely ill-advised.
We've seen the popular media analogies gradually become more accurate in their understanding that this is a novel question. And, admittedly, hats off to Tim Cooke and Apple for getting more technically accurate descriptions out in the media.
We do seem to be having a more productive discussion socially this time around.
I think the last major rebalancing of rights due to new technology concerned copyable copywritten digital media and... we decided to make a lot of things that are technically trivial illegal. Not the best message to kids that "these things are illegal, but easy to do and unenforceable."
>The power to collect evidence to resolve criminal cases is one of the most fundamental powers of the state.
I agree. But it is no where stated or implied that this should be an unlimited power. In fact, clear limits are placed upon that authority.
If I invent a cypher and store all of my physical written works using that cypher, can the government compel me to decrypt those works upon discovery that they lack the ability to do so? What if I taught that cypher to my family? Can they be compelled? If so, under what authority?
>You might just as productively suggest that we can't trust the USG to be a responsible state
This suggestion is inherent within the Constitution. It is framed upon a mistrust of any Government to not become tyrannical.
>therefore it should disband
uh, what? nice leap.. did you use rocket shoes to get over the gap?
What "clear limits" are you referring to? Remember, this case is about the limits judges have in compelling the production of evidence. What are the limits on that authority?
It's unclear whether you will eventually be compelled into decrypting documents. One circuit says you can't be, because of 5A. But that ruling was situational, and other courts might rule otherwise. Certainly I don't personally agree with the logic that compelled decryption is necessarily testimonial in nature, any more than opening a safe for which only you have the combination is testimony. The primary purpose of the ban on coerced self-testimony is to prevent bogus confessions elicited under torture. That's not at issue here.
I don't understand your "inherent within the Constitution" argument. The Constitution says what it says. I'm citing it.
It is my understanding that the central issue is not the judges authority to compel evidence be turned over to the state. The State is already in possession of the evidence, it is simply in a format that is unintelligible. Apple is not in possession of any evidence.
The issue is whether a third party can be compelled to provide access to that evidence in order to make it intelligible and therefore meaningful. The combination to the lock (which apple claims they would be forced to construct, as it does not yet exist. The government seems to have accepted the veracity of this claim when they agreed to perform the labor if handed the tooling).
What is the purpose of explicitly stating 4A if we can simply trust the government to be a good actor?
It is inherent in the statement of explicit restraint that there is not trust.
Preamble to the Bill of Rights -
"The Conventions of a number of the States, having at the time of their adopting the Constitution, expressed a desire, in order to prevent misconstruction or abuse of its powers, that further declaratory and restrictive clauses should be added: And as extending the ground of public confidence in the Government, will best ensure the beneficent ends of its institution."
I like that they use confidence.. it implies a matter of shades or degrees. Trust seems to imply something much more B&W.
I'm sorry, but this still isn't a coherent argument. The Fourth Amendment delegates to the court the decision over whether a search is or isn't reasonable. It is a court that has ordered this particular search. The court is part of the government.
If you can't trust any part of the government, the Fourth Amendment is immaterial: you can't trust the entity to whom is entrusted the power to adjudicate reasonableness.
The power of the courts is kept in check by the Legislature. They are not above elements of mistrust.
The court is compelling a third party to perform an act that really isn't part of a search and seizure of items.
Search and Seizure as defined by 4A is over and done with. The Prosecution has searched the "places to be searched" and is in possession of the "persons or things to be seized."
Now can it compel Apple to make them useful? (Potentially useful, as even the State has argued there likely isn't really any useful evidence there anyway.. sorta makes this whole thing look like a dog and pony show.)
Its an electronic search of a device in the FBI's possession. Clearly this is a modern issue that exceeds the language of the Constitution etc. Its a fair question - how much extra work can a manufacturer be compelled to do for the FBI, to enable them to understand the device/information they have already seized? The word 'search' is being stretched to the breaking point here.
I didn't intend to be inflammatory (at least any more so than the parent), merely point out that a logical leap had been taken that was not entirely faithful (imho) on the part of the writer.
It is certainly not "mistrust government" ergo "disband government", especially when the government in question was formed near entirely upon the notion that a government should exist in a perpetual state of mistrust.
A monopoly on violence is the fundamental power of the state, which isn't being challenged here. What is being challenged is the state's methods of evidence collection, which determines an attribute of the state - not its existence. Put more simply: you haven't leapt in your logic, you've presented a false equivalence.
The collection of evidence (more broadly: the investigation of crimes) is one of the core purposes to which the state's monopoly on violence is applied, so the issues are the same.
You are doubling down on a logical fallacy. By your logic a state that has no law enforcement investigations is not a state, regardless of military strength and the sovereignty that enables. Now you may say that you would not want to live in such a place, but you can't with a straight face deny that it is still a state. As far as lumping potential precursor activities (evidence collection) in with the eventual excising of violence (arrest), and a challenge to the former is a challenge to the latter... by that logic the US isn't a state - because there are already plenty of restrictions in place.
tptacek's argument, as I understand it, is that evidence collection is the beginning of the chain that allows enforcing laws.
Not being able to collect evidence precludes legal enforcement, which precludes laws, which precludes the existence of a state in the modern definition. Which is the same line of reasoning that most of the "pro-legally breakable encryption" follow, even if they don't carry it out to conclusion explicitly.
I think it's fair to say a state in which everyone uses strong encryption (that cannot be penetrated by the state in any circumstance) in every digital facet of their lives does look very different from the one we currently have (at least in technologically advanced states).
> ...the beginning of the chain that allows enforcing laws.
Years ago I wrote software for supply chain loss prevention, every so often there would be a crisis (like a hijacking) that put the department into investigation mode - where there was no room for long term strategic thought. But the course was always corrected when the department director would remind everybody that the job was "loss prevention" and not "loss apprehension". So while criminal investigation is currently a big part of law enforcement, it isn't the primary objective. If that concept sounds strange, check out Bruce Schneier's work.
> ...which precludes the existence of a state in the modern definition.
Is that true, have we redefined the state to only include governments with laws? What do we call the entities formerly known as states that no longer fit the new definition? I wonder how long until we redefine law. I'm really hoping that when you say "modern definition" you actually mean "the definition Jay Leno would get while grabbing people off the street who previously gave the matter no thought".
I do agree with your point thought, I think that those who are predicting catastrophe are more concerned with maintaining the status quo - and when they say the world will end, they mean their estimate of the way the world works. The mental crisis is so great for some that they will craft incredibly convoluted justification, and may go so far was to start redefining words :)