[conceit]

Imagine an object that is unique in exactly one respect, and another in two. Obviously, the other has more uniqueness. Now, if a the first has precisely only the one characteristic of having not really any characteristic at all, then that's a totally different degree of uniqueness. So either is more unique in a specific respect. But Arguably, the nothingness is most unique, if not the only really unique thing. So if we can ignore that, because no one in his right mind would talk about nothing, we can most of always readily conclude, that the first type of a collection of unique'ish things is concerned.

Is this regression ad absurdum or argumentum ad silencium?

[SixSigma]

I like your thinking.

The link I posted really concerns the insufferability of someone who corrects technicalities of language rather than a discussion on whether uniqueness is a countable property.