[saurik]

Which is probably why the FBI didn't ask for access to this key (which, FWIW, is stored in an HSM at Apple, and so would have to be "borrowed" rather than copied): instead, they are asking Apple to provide a firmware which can be used "onto the SUBJECT DEVICE" (capitalization is from original text). The firmware update process requires signing a hash of the firmware with at least (depends on the device) the ECID of the specific device in question, and so if Apple complies with the order as written they actually only empower the FBI against this specific device. Again: they make it sound like some herculean task to build the software, but the only actual complexity here is the signing.

[acqq]

The "actual complexity" estimated by a single hobby programmer only at the technical level is not the way this attempt should be evaluated, as I've already pointed. It's the All Writs use to request the change of the product used by hundreds of millions and the precedent of it, that is the main issue here:

In Cook's words:

http://techcrunch.com/2016/02/22/in-employee-email-apple-ceo...

"We feel the best way forward would be for the government to withdraw its demands under the All Writs Act and, as some in Congress have proposed, form a commission or other panel of experts on intelligence, technology and civil liberties to discuss the implications for law enforcement, national security, privacy and personal freedoms."

It is far from "just one small thing." As far as I understand you've already made some unauthorized changes to Apple products, and I can understand how you see it as "easy" but your technical experience, even if it's notable, is not the topic.

[saurik]

...which is a complaint with the law, which is fine: you can complain about that law all you want. The problem I have is with stuff like their answer to the question "Could Apple build this operating system just once, for this iPhone, and never use it again?", which essentially is outright lying: the "master key" in question is their signing key, not some piece of trivial software they develop (and then sign) in order to automate this process for the FBI. Apple already has the only master key of relevance: that key already exists; the idea that the master key is something that they need to "build" and then would have to "protect" is them trying to divert attention from what is actually important.

Even if you think I'm wrong (to which I highly recommend you ask some other people, preferably strong developers, as the idea that this is difficult for Apple to build isn't me "estimating" here, it is the kind of idea that should be discarded at the face of it as it is so absurd... this is something they could assign an intern to and it would still be done in a few hours), then we are just talking about some different time period for someone to build the software here: whatever it is, it is fundamentally insignificant in comparison to Apple spending a few minutes to use their key and sign the firmware. The world isn't somehow different once that software exists, even if you think it is hard to build: what is fundamentally different is only that people realize the government might be able to force Apple to use their key.

[acqq]

They still have to develop the different version of the software even if it's just changing some specific statements and recompiling and then signing. Not to mention that it also has to be tested, installed, access controlled etc. So it actually has to be built, tested and protected. What do they "outright lie" can you please quote?

> The world isn't somehow different once that software exists

It is, if it's made by Apple now, since it makes the legal precedent in how All Writs is accepted by Apple to be used. It even makes it a precedent for other companies too. That's why they question it and rightly so.

That's why if FBI or you would have managed to produce some cracking tool now, without Apple's help, it wouldn't matter. It wouldn't affect the development of even more secure phones by Apple.

Technically-hard-or-not-hard, as claimed by an-intern-or-the-Cydia-author is, once again, irrelevant.

> what is fundamentally different is only that people realize the government might be able to force Apple to use their key.

Government already tried to force them and Cook responded, literally: "We feel the best way forward would be for the government to withdraw its demands under the All Writs Act" so people hopefully already realize what is at stake and at least we discuss it.