[pfg]

First of all, it sets a precedent that companies can be forced to create software that willfully compromises their security mechanisms. This is very much different from your typical data dump ordered by a judge. It's quite likely that the FBI and other law enforcement agencies would use such a precedent in many future cases.

Second, it's unclear how easy it would be to create firmware that only works on a specific device. What if there's a bug, or what if someone finds a way to spoof the device ID that would probably be checked? It could very well end up being a backdoor for all iPhones after all (or, at least, for all iPhones without a Secure Enclave).

This EFF article has a couple more points[1].

[1]: https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/02/technical-perspective-...

[mirimir]

Yes, the precedent is the key thing here.

Let's say that Apple crafted an update that does what the FBI wants. That in itself wouldn't put other iPhones at risk, as long as a signed copy of that malicious update didn't leave Apple's custody. The FBI hasn't even asked for that. They say that Apple could do all the work in house. Furthermore, it's unlikely that this malicious update would work on newer iPhones.

But the precedent would be established.