[esonica]

I feel it would. Imagine a script kiddie in Australia decides to join the DDOS attack on the government site.

He is easily traced by IP, and the Australian Federal Police come to visit.

His new 'rights', now that he is part of a terror group include:

Being held for up to nine days in detention without being formally charged.

Warrantless searches

The seizure of any objects associated with the terrorist act (this is quite a wide open definition, basically anything you own is up for grabs)

Also the AFP have some quite invasive computer techniques that are used to go wandering through your system before they knock on the door.

[ramchip]

Your list makes me feel a little sad. In Japan you can be searched or held for up to one month without being charged - no need for even a terrorism excuse. Heck, according to the laws I could be banned from the country for forgetting my ID card at home. I hope Australia and the US don't go further down that slope.

[dirtbox]

Useless. They wouldn't find anything on the kid's computer, in all likelihood he clicked a link on an anonymously created website that ran a script from his browser. Once he's released all he need do is post his story on a blog and he'll be international news within a month.

[pyre]

They'll find something/anything they can on the kid's computer to charge him with a crime. Maybe a thumbnail of a kiddie porn image in his web cache because he happened to click the wrong link or view the wrong page?

[wendroid]

Can you name the US Anonymous member that was imprisoned for a year and fined $37,500 for DDoS ing the Scientology website ?

[dgordon]

I can. Can anyone name all the others that weren't?

[itistoday]

> He is easily traced by IP

I have a feeling that a group of people calling themselves 'anonymous' have probably heard of torproject.org

[knome]

Wouldn't using an encrypted onion routed network put a bit of a pinch on the amount of DDOS traffic one could push? Not to mention that there is probably an upper bound to the amount of traffic any given exit-node is willing to allow for. How many exit nodes restrict outbound connections to common ports?

[jdietrich]

Anon's preferred tool are the array of open HTTP proxies available. They provide relatively weak anonymity, but in scale it works well enough. LEAs have to subpoena the proxy owner and their ISP for logs, usually the owner has very poor logging anyway, often they're based in a foreign jurisdiction... There just aren't the resources available to go after them in any real numbers. They can (and do) go after a couple of people to make an example of them, but they always seem to pick on the low-hanging fruit who didn't go through a proxy.

[itistoday]

I'm wasn't suggesting that they'd use Tor itself for the DDoS, only that through it they can hide their traces.

[ramchip]

AFAIK anons don't have access to botnets and such, they flood from their own computers. Their sheer number makes it 'distributed'.

Like when they modified the Times most influential person ranking, it was just a lot of people running an auto-voter on their machine.

[prole]

Quite the opposite. The journalist idea of "Anonymous" is very different from the insider idea of Anonymous. In the simplest terms, Anonymous is anyone, really. It's not limited to 4chan users (there are other chans, and the users sometimes overlap). 4chan itself is just a convenient place to recruit people to perform an attack and later use as a scapegoat.

As an example, the anti-Scientology protests were reported under the catch-all banner of Anonymous, but the people organizing it and hitting the streets were also from rival forums such as Something Awful. Funny enough, the protest movement is completely different from (and at odds with) the original catalyst: other Anons DDoSing Scientology websites for using the DMCA to take down a video on YouTube. As someone mentioned earlier in the comments, one core motivation is trolling, or "lulz," so under this so-large-its-useless umbrella term "Anonymous," there are groups sabotaging one another just because it's funny.

The core people organizing* these DDoS attacks come and go, but they are a dedicated few who have the time and skills to design such programs to distribute to the masses. As in the Time magazine hack, it was respectably sophisticated (this article does it justice: http://musicmachinery.com/2009/04/15/inside-the-precision-ha...). And yes, this core group does have botnets, as well as excellent social engineering skills to motivate *channers to download and execute their software.

I love watching people and organizations of all varieties underestimate just how tenaciously annoying they can be.

[pyre]

Well, in this case anon is the botnet.

[ramchip]

It's different, and that's the point I wanted to make. A botnet owner could use tor to hide his own computer's address, and let the bots flood freely. Even if a few were traced, he doesn't care. Tor gives him privacy (for his master computer) without compromising his attack potential.

A 4chan poster can't do the same thing. He's attacking from his own computer. Either he attacks through tor (slow) or he doesn't (unsafe). Hence why I thought the post above does not make sense for anon's case: he can't hide his traces without channelling the attack through Tor itself.