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by msbarnett
3777 days ago
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> Waiting until login until you upgrade to bcrypt is a requirement is compotent password storage It's not even remotely competent. This blog makes it clear they're not even sure how their secret key was stolen. These hashes could be walking out their backdoor as I type this. Keeping vulnerable hashes at rest is insane. It would be far more competent to bcrypt the SHA-2s, so that at least when the hashes wander out the backdoor they haven't really found, peoples passwords aren't trivially attackable. > In order to do this without people logging in Linode would have to bcrypt hash the SHA-2 hashed passwords and then keep doing that for all password validations. No, they'd just have to replace Bcrypt(SHA-2(password)) with Bcrypt(password) once the customer finally logs in. It's an immediate net upgrade to the resistance of at-rest Hashes to brute force attacks with zero downside. |
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My point was that if you have a system which can go straight from SHA2(password) to bcrypt(password) then the system must be storing the plaintext of the password, which would be very bad.