It's also fairly consistent with past SCOTUS decisions, like the 1957 decision United States vs Auto Workers:
"The principle at stake is not peculiar to unions. It is applicable as well to associations of manufacturers, retail and wholesale trade groups, consumers' leagues, farmers' unions, religious groups, and every other association representing a segment of American life and taking an active part in our political campaigns and discussions .... It is therefore important -- vitally important -- that all channels of communication be open to [all of the above types of associations] during every election, that no point of view be restrained or barred, and that the people have access to the views of every group in the community."
Scalia's comment in CU itself is relevant here:
"The [First] Amendment is written in terms of “speech,” not speakers. Its text offers no foothold for excluding any category of speaker"
In this case, he's referring to the "category" of a corporation, which is referenced in the 1886 decision Pembina Consolidated Silver Mining Co. v. Pennsylvania:
"corporations are merely associations of individuals united for a special purpose"
which parallels the 1830 statement in Providence bank vs Billings by Chief Justice Marshall:
"The great object of an incorporation is to bestow the character and properties of individuality on a collective and changing body of men."
and even further back, to the 1790 case The Rev John Bracken v. The Visitors of Wm & Mary College, which was in essence about the question of whether those running the college were bound by the decisions of its original founders or whether they had the right to, collectively, make changes according to their assessment of how to best carry out the common purpose for which the college existed.
While not directly about speech, the 1819 case Dartmouth College v. Woodward establishes limits on the legislature's ability to modify private contracts, such as the charter that established Dartmouth, and a series of later decisions specified that any modification must not harm shareholders, founders, members, etc.
And Santa Clara County v Southern Pacific Railroad Company (1886) establishes (indirectly) that corporations are entitled to the same type of 14th amendment due-process and equal-protection rights as individuals. Basically, just because people have organized into a group doesn't mean the government can treat them worse than it would if they were not corporately organized.
"The principle at stake is not peculiar to unions. It is applicable as well to associations of manufacturers, retail and wholesale trade groups, consumers' leagues, farmers' unions, religious groups, and every other association representing a segment of American life and taking an active part in our political campaigns and discussions .... It is therefore important -- vitally important -- that all channels of communication be open to [all of the above types of associations] during every election, that no point of view be restrained or barred, and that the people have access to the views of every group in the community."
Scalia's comment in CU itself is relevant here:
"The [First] Amendment is written in terms of “speech,” not speakers. Its text offers no foothold for excluding any category of speaker"
In this case, he's referring to the "category" of a corporation, which is referenced in the 1886 decision Pembina Consolidated Silver Mining Co. v. Pennsylvania:
"corporations are merely associations of individuals united for a special purpose"
which parallels the 1830 statement in Providence bank vs Billings by Chief Justice Marshall:
"The great object of an incorporation is to bestow the character and properties of individuality on a collective and changing body of men."
and even further back, to the 1790 case The Rev John Bracken v. The Visitors of Wm & Mary College, which was in essence about the question of whether those running the college were bound by the decisions of its original founders or whether they had the right to, collectively, make changes according to their assessment of how to best carry out the common purpose for which the college existed.
While not directly about speech, the 1819 case Dartmouth College v. Woodward establishes limits on the legislature's ability to modify private contracts, such as the charter that established Dartmouth, and a series of later decisions specified that any modification must not harm shareholders, founders, members, etc.
And Santa Clara County v Southern Pacific Railroad Company (1886) establishes (indirectly) that corporations are entitled to the same type of 14th amendment due-process and equal-protection rights as individuals. Basically, just because people have organized into a group doesn't mean the government can treat them worse than it would if they were not corporately organized.