| > My issue is that universal default unbreakable encryption doesn't just break dragnet surveillance, but also breaks discovery and evidence recovery done under a warrant in routine investigations. I don't think it affects discovery at all: discovery relies on turning over responsive materials, not breaking encryption. Anytime evidence doesn't exist or is difficult to interpret because it hasn't been deliberately created in a form which is readily interpreted by uninvolved third parties, it can impair the utility of search and seizure warrants to collect evidence. But this is unavoidable, and compelling affairs to be conducted in a manner which provides the most convenience for law enforcement after-the-fact is simply untenable in pretty much every area of life (encryption is not special this way.) In the case of data/communications, if an untrusted third party can access your data/communications without your consent, many untrusted third parties can. A ban on secure end-to-end encryption (whether it take the form of mandatory MitM/backdoors, restrictions on parties that can be endpoints in secure end-to-end links, or whatever other form) means exposing everyones data to many potential attackers, just so that law enforcement might have convenient access later. The development of pervasive electronic communication and data storage/consumption technology means one of two things, either: (1) people are far more exposed to both criminal exploitation and government abuse of power, but routine, rights-respecting law enforcement is not burdened and, in fact, somewhat eased, or (2) people are able to do far more without additional vulnerability, and perhaps with a net less vulnerability, to various forms of criminal exploitation and government abuse, but routine, rights-respecting law enforcement is made more difficult. And the former option requires curtailing substantially the freedom of speech in electronic media (or perhaps all media) in ways it never was curtailed in other media. |