[Alupis]

> You clearly can be compelled to produce private documents as evidence.

You are correct - but only via due process (court order/warrant, etc..).

What we have here is not due process - but rather systematic bulk collection and inspection of all electronic communications from every citizen. These private communications are then sifted through, looking for anything of interest... and if found, we then (sometimes) go get a warrant to retro-actively wiretap your communications. That's not legal, but it's what's going on.

Regarding full-device encryption - it's the same thing. You need a warrant to compel me to turn over my device. No law makes it legal for the government to "hack" into your device remotely and inspect it's contents (unless you have a specific warrant). If the individual refuses to turn over the device or decrypt it, it's no different than someone refusing to turn over a written letter... and we have punishments for these actions. We don't need to ban encryption for this, we already have mechanisms in place to handle these situations.

[tptacek]

Again, who are you arguing with? Abuses of systematic collection are a great reason to support universal encryption. Certainly, it's the primary reason I support it.

[Alupis]

> Again, who are you arguing with?

Why do you keep trying to shut this down? I'm clearly arguing against points you have made in the quotes cited in my post.

> Abuses of systematic collection are a great reason to support universal encryption. Certainly, it's the primary reason I support it.

I think we finally agree here. I just don't know why you appear to keep making counter arguments if this is how you truly feel.

[tptacek]

Because systematic collection isn't the only, or even the most important, issue at stake in the "going dark" debate.

[Alupis]

Then what is at stake here?

We have essentially a decade of evidence to show having access to electronic communications (both encrypted and not) has little to zero effect on law enforcement's ability to do their job.

Just recently, the Paris attackers use unencrypted cell phone text messages to coordinate and plan their attack. Nobody detected it...

Before that, the FBI successfully caught Ross Ulbricht, through good 'ol police work (because they couldn't beat his encryption and proxy usage).

We don't need access to private communications (both encrypted and not) in order to conduct lawful law enforcement -- we just need better law enforcement practices.

All this anti-encryption rederick put forth by the government is really just smoke and mirrors, covering up systematic failures of law enforcement.

[tptacek]

This seems far-fetched. Encryption has historically had zero effect on law enforcement, but collection of electronic evidence has made thousands of felony cases. Meanwhile, the issue isn't simply what criminals encrypt today, but the fact that everything they do will be encrypted in 15 years.

[Alupis]

> the issue isn't simply what criminals encrypt today, but the fact that everything they do will be encrypted in 15 years

Everything everyone does will be encrypted in 15 years -- and that's a good thing. It makes it harder for the bad guys to be, well, bad.

Identity theft happens to far more Americans every year than the number that have been involved in a terrorist attack since the founding of our nation.[1] Backdooring/weakening/banning encryption will literally make stealing people's identities far easier. We want to make the government's job marginally easier to spy on everyone at any time, but we're ignoring the major side-effects of doing just that.

[1] http://www.techjuice.pk/a-data-scientist-explains-odds-of-dy...

[dragonwriter]

> Meanwhile, the issue isn't simply what criminals encrypt today, but the fact that everything they do will be encrypted in 15 years.

No, everything they do will not be encrypted in 15 years. Most relevantly, except when the crime at issue itself is an act of communication, the crime won't be encrypted, or even subject to encryption, so all the usual police work that enables solving crime based on the actual criminal act and the evidence naturally attaching thereto will remain available.

[dragonwriter]

> We have essentially a decade of evidence

For extremely large values of "decade".