[costan]

SGX serves a good purpose, at least in theory. Many people, myself included, wanted it to turn out to be good. So, I don't think many Intel folks objected to it.

Instead, I think that a bunch of MBAs showed up and decided SGX is security, security is an enterprise thing, so SGX must be pay-to-play. For whatever it's worth, I think the SGX designers did a pretty good job of separating the objectionable parts from the rest of the design.

For example, the EPID homebrew crypto is all in software, so Intel can change the algorithm without hardware mods or microcode updates.

Also, the way they set up the Launch Enclave gives Intel time until the very last minute to not be a douche. They still have the option to release a permissive Launch Enclave that only includes the checks needed to keep attestation secure.

The SGX design that doesn't come from MBAs is quite clean, given that it addresses the multi-layered crap pile that is X86. There are some cool tricks in there.

[nullc]

Intel presented on SGX at Real World crypto.

If the functionality works as is being described here, I feel they deceived the audience, both in their presentations and in 1:1 discussions.

This is especially unfortunate, since I know for a fact their actions have influenced purchasing decisions.