[conradev]

Nowhere in the article does it say that Apple actually compromised the end to end nature of an iMessage conversation. All I see is this:

> Apple could collaborate with law enforcement to provide a false key, thereby intercepting a specific user’s messages, and the user would be none the wiser.

Key word is "could". Apple "could" also use its signing keys to install any kind of software on your phone to do whatever it wants. For example, to read your keychain and pull your private keys.

[yuhong]

And due to the design of CALEA (it dates back to 1994) they can't force Apple to do this easier, which is one of the things that started the entire encryption backdoor debate in the first place.

[yuhong]

they can't force Apple to do this easier

*either

[free2rhyme214]

In the link I provided Nicholas Weaver explains how iMessage's encryption is compromised.

[conradev]

It's compromise-able, meaning Apple could decide to MITM a conversation going forward.

But for conversations that have already occurred – Apple does not have the private keys.