[DonaldFisk]

I think Searle's mostly correct and Kurzweil's completely wrong on this. It took me a long time to understand Searle's argument, because Searle conflates consciousness and intelligence and this confuses matters. Understanding Chinese is a difficult problem requiring intelligence, but I don't think it requires consciousness.

It is important to distinguish between "understanding Chinese" and "knowing what it's like to understand Chinese". We immediately have a problem: knowing what it's like to understand Chinese involves various qualia, none of which is unique to Chinese speakers.

So I'll simplify the argument. Instead of having a room with a book containing rules about Chinese, and a person inside who doesn't Chinese, we have a room, with some coloured filters, and a person who can't see any colours at all (i.e. who has achromatopsia). Such people (e.g. http://www.achromatopsia.info/knut-nordby-achromatopsia-p/) will confirm they have no idea what it's like to see colours. If you shove a sheet of coloured paper under the door, the person in the room will place the different filters on top of the sheet in turn, and by seeing how dark the paper then looks, be able to determine its colour, which he'll write on the paper, and pass it back to the person outside. The person outside thinks the person inside can distinguish colours, but the person inside will confirm that not only can he not, but he doesn't even know what it's like. Nothing else in the room is obviously conscious.

A propos of the dog, this is the other minds problem. It's entirely possible that I'm the only conscious being in the universe and everyone else (and their pets) are zombies. But we think that people, dogs, etc. are conscious because they are similar to us in important ways. Kurzweil presumably considers computers to be conscious too. Computers can be intelligent, and maybe in a few years or decades will be able to pass themselves off over the Internet as Chinese speakers, but there's no reason to believe computers have qualia (i.e. know what anything is like), and given the above argument, every reason to believe that they don't.

[TheOtherHobbes]

This is basically just the Hard Problem of consciousness. It's been a hard problem for decades, and we're no closer to having an answer.

>But we think that people, dogs, etc. are conscious because they are similar to us in important ways.

Specifically, mammals have mirror neurones. More complex mammals also seem to have common hard-wired links between emotions and facial expressions - so emotional expression is somewhat recognisable across species.

I'm finding the AI debates vastly frustrating. There are basic features of being a sentient mammal - like having a body with a complicated sensory net, and an endocrine system with goal/avoidance sensations and emotions, and awareness of social hierarchy and other forms of bonding - that are being ignored in superficial arguments about paperclip factories.

It's possible that a lot of what we experience as consciousness happens at all of those levels. The ability to write code or find patterns or play chess floats along on top, often in a very distracted way.

So the idea that an abstract symbol processing machine can be conscious in any way we understand seems wrong-headed. Perhaps recognisable consciousness is more likely to appear on top of a system that models the senses, emotions, and social awareness first, topped by a symbolic abstraction layer that includes a self-model to "experience" those lower levels, recursively.

[toxik]

This might be very tangential, but I had a very acute sensation of learning something new the other day. There are these stereographic images, where they put the left and right eye's intended image next to each other -- and with a little practice, you can angle your eyes so each eye looks at a separate picture. Suddenly your double vision starts to make MORE sense than regular vision, because you're now able to combine the two images to get a sense of depth in the image. The tricky part is now to focus your eyes; at first, you'll reflexively correct your eyes too and the illusion (or the combination rather) goes away.

But bit by bit, you learn to control your eye's focal length independent of "where" in space you want to look. It really is astonishing.

It made me think of consciousness as a measure of ability to integrate information, because this process is truly fascinating to anybody who tries it (and I really think you should!) Perhaps that's because with this trick, you were able to integrate more information, and thus tickle your brain more?

[leafee]

> conflates consciousness and intelligence and this confuses matters

I think this is an excellent point. I like your example with colors, which shows that there is a difference between seeing (i.e. experiencing) colors and producing symbols which give the impression that an entity can see colors.

I don't follow any argument that proposed that computers can be conscious but other machines (e.g. car engines) cannot. In the end, symbols don't really exist in physical reality - all that exists is physical 'stuff' - atoms, electrons, photons etc. interacting with each other. So how can we say that one ball of stuff is conscious but another is not? And why isn't all of the stuff together also conscious? Why not just admit we don't know yet?

Consciousness may be hard to define, but lets take something simpler - experience, or even more specifically - pain. I can feel pain. While I can't be 100% sure, I believe other humans feel pain as well. However I don't believe my laptop has the capacity to feel pain, irrespective of how many times and in how many languages it can say 'I feel pain'.

Perhaps the ability to experience is the defining characteristic of consciousness?

[redwood]

I disagree completely. After time the color filter will start to associate various concepts and feelings add images with various colors. This association is what starts making the colors themselves have meaning even if they can't see the colors the same way that you and I can. There's no way to prove that we all see colors the same way anyway. But that doesn't mean that we don't believe that were conscious. I think I see that you're saying we cannot make any claims about others perhaps but only can talk about how we feel. But I feel like the room example is actually misleading in this respect. Another way of thinking about it is our brain starts to associate things and if those clusters of associations that give those things meaning. The experience of experience and color is only important because experience and color has a web of other associated experiences that those colors remind us of. So extending the room experiment to the experience of a baby who throughout the entire life sees colors or the filter image version of these colors at various moments to associate with various things. In this example we can imagine that the baby will in fact associate let's say blue with I don't know this great unknown half of our outside ceiling that we see during the day. And then that will take on something more to it but it is difficult admittedly to explain.

[DonaldFisk]

> After time the color filter will start to associate various concepts and feelings add images with various colors. This association is what starts making the colors themselves have meaning even if they can't see the colors the same way that you and I can.

The filters are just pieces of transparent coloured plastic. How are they capable of forming associations?

Also, associations on their own (e.g. blue with sky, red with blood, green with grass) don't give you any idea what colours are like. Knut Nordby (and many other people with achromatopsia) knew these associations as well as you or I know them, but made it quite clear that he had no idea what it was like to see in colour.

[leafee]

> The experience of experience and color is only important because experience and color has a web of other associated experiences that those colors remind us of

So what about those original experiences? How are they important at all if there is nothing to associate them with?