[vezzy-fnord]

I do not believe that the property owner may do whatever they wish within their property.

Then you don't really support property rights. I mean, certainly, property owners must be within the bounds of the common and civil law framework of their jurisdiction. Limiting how property is internally arranged is a wholly different matter, it's a direct veto on how someone schedules their production structure for no reason but the failings of people who they have no stake in. By protecting customers from "themselves" and thus also protecting owners from customers, you are curtailing rights of both to engage in voluntary contract.

It is a mere implementation detail, not an end in itself.

Not free market economy. Market economy in general. It's not at all an "implementation detail," it arises quite organically out of interpersonal exchange.

hence I propose regulation

You know what I loathe?

Let's take everything you've said at face value.

You provide a case for perceived suboptimal behavior of markets, but then by proposing regulation you completely ignore the prospect of suboptimal government action! That is absolutely disingenuous. Your proposal exists outside of reality and assumes a hypothetical benevolent exogenous regulator that doesn't actually exist (as opposed to real states which are complex institutions).

You'd do yourself good by reading up on some public choice theory.

[brc]

The salient point here is the massive disconnect most people carry around in their heads. If presented with a problem, the automatic response of most people is to get the government to fix it. If you quiz the same people on something their government does well, you're unlikely to get a clear answer. Anytime you propose a private solution to a problem, people will get upset and say 'you can't make a profit from that'. But again, what are government employees than people making a profit on the trade of their time? We are all aware of government employees who have traded their way into highly paid, unsackable positions. Are these people more or less moral than a small business owner who takes home a similar amount of pay?

I don't know when the knee jerk of 'regulate it' came in, despite decades of evidence of failure and unintended consequences from that same instinct.

[zxcdw]

> Then you don't really support property rights.

Or we simply disagree what rights and liabilities the property owner should have in the context, which I define as business property. I see no problem with this as there are many countries with extensive liabilities and regulations when it comes to property and business practices one is allowed to conduct.

> By protecting customers from "themselves" and thus also protecting owners from customers, you are curtailing rights of both to engage in voluntary contract.

Oh I indeed am, or I at least am not opposing regulation in this matter from any ideological perspective. I don't see such regulation as inherently bad, as it seems that you see.

> It's not at all an "implementation detail," it arises quite organically out of interpersonal exchange.

Many things arise "quite organically" from individual actors acting for their own benefit, but in many cases it can be argued for that there are places and times where regulation (governmental or otherwise) does indeed improve the society and the lives of the people within it.

> You know what I loathe?

I suppose I don't despite having some suspicions, but please, don't assume I care either.

> You provide a case for perceived suboptimal behavior of markets, but then by proposing regulation you completely ignore the prospect of suboptimal government action!

How couldn't you say this exact same about any form of regulation within markets? And if so, to me it seems that you oppose regulation out of a principle -- and really, how you come off as suggests the same.

> You'd do yourself good by reading up on some public choice theory.

Oh, always, though I am almost certain our differing views lie somewhere else completely. I suppose you have recommendations though?

[vezzy-fnord]

Actually my opposition to regulation isn't an ideological default. It's borne out of my analysis weighing endogenous regulation (contracts signed by actors with judicial assistance to enforce them) against exogenous regulations, like that of a collective body of action, i.e. government. There's been a lot written on this subject.

(To answer your statement, if there is a stalemate such that both government failure and market failure are inevitable, I would prefer the latter, for the simple reason that it entails less layers of indirection and that it doesn't impose any upper bound on heterogeneous consumer preferences.)

That said, I do have some reading recommendations.

James M. Buchanan was an eminent economist and political theoretician. I'd recommend his classic The Calculus of Consent co-written with Gordon Tullock, supplemented with his own The Limits of Liberty and Costs and Choice.

William A. Niskanen wrote Bureaucracy and Representative Government presenting a budget-maximizing theory of government akin to a utility-maximizing theory of an economic actor. Both have limitations, but it's worth reading.

Don Lavoie wrote great primers such as Rivalry and Central Planning and National Economic Planning: What Is Left? which equally apply to a mixed economy.

R.H. Coase formulated the Coase theorem in his paper "The Problem of Social Cost," demonstrating how private property rights plus low transaction costs lead to endogenous self-regulatory actions.

Oliver E. Williamson wrote a technical work on transaction cost economics entitled The Mechanisms of Governance. Another technical writer was Lester G. Telser, particularly his work on the "core theory" related to cooperation, coordination and collusion.

Essays and papers by Armen A. Alchian, Harold Demsetz and Yale Brozen are also worth examining.

For a bare introduction, see Government Failure: A Primer in Public Choice, or a recent paper using behavioral theory to analyze public policy [1].

[1] http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2015/...