[ndm00]

This issue brings up a larger point that many in the tech world have ignored for awhile. Now that end to end encryption is easily accessible by everyone, how do the authorities figure out beforehand when a terrorist attack will take place? The answer is not banning encryption technologies or giving authorities a 'key' as the FBI director has proposed. But now authorities have a very difficult problem on their hands. Encryption can't be contained, and the authorities need to figure out how to still catch the bad guys.

[err4nt]

It takes what it has always taken: good police work.

Encryption is like envelopes for the mail. They can be broken into with enough force, but their purpose it to shield the contents of the message from those handling it in transit. A post card offers no such protection.

So suppose the banned encryption (envelopes). Im sure the government would still reauire envelopes. As would anybody dealing with health records. Or banking, financial stuff has a legitimate need for secrecy. So they ned envelopes.

Pretty soon what you have is a class of people allowed to USE envelopes and a class of people not allowed it use them.

Like envelopes, encryption is an idea, not an inplementation. They may block you from using this tool or that tool, just like a government could make selling pre-made envelopes illegal - but the IDEA of encryption is simple just like the idea of an envelope. Anybody with paper, scissors, and glue can fashion their own envelope. Encyption is the same, one person can dream up an build their own encoder and you can never ban or prevent that idea from being used.

[pdkl95]

https://www.philzimmermann.com/EN/essays/WhyIWrotePGP.html

"Why I Wrote PGP", by Philip Zimmermann

We really need to emphasize the envelope metaphor a lot more. It's much easier for non-technical propel to understand than any discussion of key/signing/etc.

[ctb_mg]

Good insight, I wonder how many nefarious plots were thwarted by surveillance rather than old-fashioned police work.

[yAnonymous]

Yeah, remember 2003, when encryption wasn't mainstream. They did a much better job back then.

You make it sound like there was a point when broad surveillance helped against terrorism, but it never did.

[ams6110]

The "smart" bad guys (most aren't, but some are) have been communicating covertly all the time. Avoiding electronic communictation entirely, using dead drops, trusted couriers, etc. You catch them by infiltrating their organizations, turning members into double-agents by bribery or blackmail, etc. the way it's always been done.

[vezzy-fnord]

That's interesting, I don't remember the jobs of law enforcement and intelligence ever having supposed to been easy. In fact, we nominally have plenty of safeguards meant to make their job difficult. That's the point. If they don't feel like devoting effort to get past barriers, then the case is not worthwhile to pursue.

Catching the bad guys is easier than ever, encryption or not.

[x1798DE]

It's not like they were particularly good at stopping terrorism before encryption became widespread. The problem is that they think they can stop all terrorist attacks, which is impossible.

[jrcii]

The right answer is intelligence gathering in the field, the old fashioned way. It's the only method that's compatible with freedom of expression and the 4th amendment.

[Zigurd]

Like they did before there was an internet to surveill. This is not a novel problem.